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ABSTRACT
REMEMBRANCES OF RITORNELLOS PAST:
LISTENING, MEMORY, MEANING
Benjamin Breuer, M.A.
University of Pittsburgh, 2004
Recent approaches to ritornello structure in J. S. Bach’s Brandenburg Concertos have
stressed the importance of the Baroque compositional technique of Fortspinnung. Yet, the
examination of what a listener remembers of the music shows that the Fortspinnung sections
seemingly do not play a role in how the music is remembered. This discrepancy suggests
a closer look at how precisely musical data are dealt with by memory and how their inter-
action with other fields of musical activity, for example, the use of terminology (the term
“ritornello” and the concepts of “ritornello structure” and “ritornello process”), influences
memorization and remembrance of music.
In this inquiry, I have chosen not to take the metaphorical stance towards memory often
adapted by musicologists; rather, I borrow information about the workings of memory from
the more mechanistic accounts of experimental neuropsychology, specifically research into
the remembrance of word lists. Since neuropsychology and musicology are not immediately
compatible, I use semiotics as a “bridge discipline” between the two.
After advocating research into music listening habits in general and defining listening
as the conceptualization of heard sounds through memory, I demonstrate the divergence of
predictions in ritornello theory and the actual mnemonic practice of listeners. I introduce
paradigmatic analysis as a means of graphic representation and Peirce’s trichotomy of icon,
index, and symbol as philosophical corollaries of observable effects in word list memory.
At various stages of the study, references to the structure and process in BWV 1046/1 are
iv
provided as examples for the application of the gained insights.
Keywords: BWV 1046, memory, neuropsychology, philosophy of music, ritornello, semi-
otics.
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PREFACE
This M.A. thesis has been in gestation for a long period of time and its sources go back
to when I was still attempting to become a neuroscientist, musicology then being of lesser
concern. Consequently, the list of people wittingly or unwittingly involved in the project is
rather long. Hence, I will mention only the most pertinent influences.
At Brandeis University, Professor Michael J. Kahana introduced me to the neuropsychol-
ogy of memory and, thus, elicited some strands of thought that here come to completion. At
the University of Pittsburgh, Professors Andrew Weintraub and Jonathan Sterne offered a
course on “Music and Communication” whose readings and discussions opened up new ways
to attack the subject of this thesis when other strands of thought began to lame. Federico
Garcia de Castro, as a colleague well-versed in typesetting and the Electronic Theses and
Dissertations (ETD) program at Pitt, introduced me to LATEX and patiently explained several
of its idiosyncrasies to an incipient LATEXnician. David Gerard Matthews helped me with
last-minute conversions of several figures encoded in various graphics formats into the PDF-
format. To the members of my committee, Professors Brodbeck, Lewis, and Rosenblum, I
owe thanks both for my induction into musicology in the various courses they offered during
the past three years and for their willingness to serve as conscientious readers of this thesis.
Academically, the person who was most involved in the development of these ideas, from
an innocent ten-page midterm paper through advice on a conference presentation to three
long semesters of patient, dilligent guidance, is Professor Don O. Franklin; I am deeply
grateful for his sense and good humor (two character traits I may have gravely tested at
times). Personally, my parents and my grandmother have shaped my outlook on life in more
ways than probably both they and I are completely aware of; I do not know an equal of their
support through what is now a good quarter-century.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
At the roots of this inquiry, about two years ago, lay a confusion on my side about what a
ritornello was and how it could be reasonably identified by a listener. The specific case of
Johann Sebastian Bach’s First Brandenburg Concerto (BWV 1046) challenged my belief in
the importance of the Fortspinnung principle for the memorization and subsequent identifi-
cation of ritornellos in the movement. Rather than the standard parameters of tutti texture,
tonal stability (at least in the opening and closing ritornellos), and a clearly recognizable
theme, it seemed that a listener might rely on motivic cues to guide his or her perception of
the movement’s structure.1 The association of certain melodic segments with the ritornello
and others with episodes allowed me to view the task of listening for temporal structure
as an exercise in the memorization and remembrance/recognition of motives, rather than
in continuous analysis of texture, harmony, and coherence at each and every instance of
listening. Once this tentative connection was made, I was able to find parallels between the
recall of word lists, an experimental method employed in cognitive neuroscience, and the
recall of ritornellos and larger sections of music. This paper presents one attempt to bridge
the methodological gap that necessarily exists between cognitive neuropsychology and musi-
cology. Because the gap in question is rather large and the philosophical reasoning required
to bridge it to my satisfaction has taken ever more hold of my mind as this project pro-
gressed, reference to the original seed around which the theory crystallized, namely Bach’s
First Brandenburg Concerto, has of necessity been limited to a few chapters.
The paper is loosely divided into two parts, one clearing the way for introducing neu-
1My confusions and their temporary but imprecise resolutions were presented in “Remembrances of
Ritornellos Past: A New Approach to Ritornello Structure in Bach’s First Brandenburg Concerto,” a paper
read at the Tenth Biennial Conference on Baroque Music, 2002, at the Universidad de la Rioja in Logron˜o,
Spain.
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ropsychology into musical analysis (Chapters 2 through 7), the other forging the connection
(Chapters 8 through 10). The second chapter gives a general account of listening and a
more detailed view of the philosophical issues involved in creating an analytical theory ap-
propriate to a listener’s situation. To step away from the theoretical issues towards a more
practical setting, the second half of the chapter describes a memory experiment; a listener’s
remembrance of melody in the first few measures of BWV 1046 is interpreted and compared
with its equivalent in the score. In the third chapter, I review the tenets of Saussurean
semiotics and I introduce paradigmatic analysis as a means of representing musical events.
Against this background, the fourth chapter provides the basis for my thinking about ritor-
nello structure; current ritornello theory is laid out and criticized, the criteria for analytical
attention to incipits and cadences are given, and the analysis of an idealized ritornello move-
ment renders generic structural characteristics of ritornello form. Based on this knowledge,
I analyze BWV 1046/1 in depth in the fifth chapter. Several modifications to the graphic
representations of the movement render insight into its structure but they also reveal the
shortcomings of an approach concentrated solely on structure. Therefore, I abandon Bach’s
concerto in the sixth chapter for a different kind of semiotics (founded by Charles Sanders
Peirce) that is more pliable to the analysis of temporal processes. The seventh chapter en-
dows the notions of iconic, indexical, and symbolic signification with temporal meanings,
which will be employed in different ways in the analysis of ritornello process.
The second part of the paper bears the heart of my argument: the eighth chapter gives a
survey of the neuroscientific results I want to employ. Subsequently, I interpret the concepts
developed by neuropsychologists in semiotic terms perhaps more familiar to musicologists;
this actually necessitates analyzing neuropsychological experimental technique more than
musicological principles. The tenth chapter returns to music; after a more theoretical ex-
cursion, I apply the developed general perceptional theory to ritornello process and derive a
mnemonic theory for the memorization and remembrance of ritornellos and episodes. In the
conclusion, I briefly survey the covered ground.
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2.0 THE TASK OF LISTENING
2.1 DISCOVERING MUSICAL MEANING
What precisely constitutes “music” or (perhaps more felicitously phrased) “the human ac-
tivity and traces thereof which we (in the English-speaking world) call ‘music”’ is a matter
of debate, especially in the academic field “musicology” that by name and calling is ulti-
mately bound to research music’s relevance to human life. I should here qualify that music
in my treatment is considered to be intimately related to the transmission of information by
soundwaves. Whether music exists only when it is listened to, whether deaf people can still
competently speak and think about music, in short, whether music is defined necessarily by
its soundedness does not at the outset concern me; I take it as an axiom of my endeavor. I
would venture that music has necessary features beyond sound but at this stage the reader
should understand “music” to mean anything anybody could sound, transform into sound,
or describe as sound.
As the previous sentence suggests, music is not only soundable (and, by implication,
hearable) but also thinkable.1 Yet, if thinking of music is possible, a new question emerges:
how do we think of what we hear? There seem to be generalized activities with respect to
the musical, framed by the concepts reception and production. All musical activities can
1I assume that any sound can be heard. Hearing here refers to nothing more than the transformation
of information transmitted by air molecule density fluctuations into information transmitted by electric
impulses in neurons. This transformation happens in the human ear, specifically the inner ear spiral known
as cochlea. Other side effects of sound waves, such as vibrations of other parts of the body, are considered
secondary.
Two excellent sources for definitions of sound are John R. Pierce, “The Nature of Musical Sound,” 1-23, and
Norman M. Weinberger, “Music and the Auditory System,” 47-88, both in The Psychology of Music, 2nd
edition [San Diego: Academic Press, 1999]. Pierce reviews the historically changing opinions about sound
while Weinberger describes the acoustic limits of the human auditory system.
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(in my opinion) be categorized as peculiar combinations of these two concepts. A closer
inspection of the “musical” reveals that music (apart from its posited dependency on sound,
actual or imagined) is not only cause for but also result of these activities, a malleable
thing informed by the idiosyncrasies of its listeners, by their individual and collective power,
by their willingness to do music themselves (as composers, performers, printers, patrons,
critics, researchers, . . . ), and by many other practices embedded in musical cultures, changing
through musical histories. If we construe “musicology” to concern itself with that subset of
the audible referred to as “music,” and if musicology indeed processes this audible matter
in the light of previously acquired knowledge, then the posited question—how we think of
what we hear—should point to the heart of musicology’s means and end, namely, what music
means.
“Musical meaning” does not have a clear, universally accepted definition and each in-
dividual using the term will endow it with a specific linguistic shade, providing the unique
basis for his analytical or scholarly endeavor. The previous paragraph pointed towards as-
pects in the human attitude to music that deserve closer attention. Which combination of
a musical activity and a means of human thinking, we ask, allows us (and anyone else) to
react in suitable ways to music, to structure it, to relate it to other social practices, and to
treasure it? I would like to suggest that (whether engaged in productive or receptive musi-
cal activities) one human perceptual practice and one faculty of the participant’s mind are
common denominators when humans conceptualize (about) music: the practice is listening
and the faculty informing it is memory.
To give a simple definition, listening may be conceived of as hearing informed by the
actions of memory. Listening is fundamental to many activities associated with music: in
dance, the dancers position themselves and orient their movements according to the beats,
the patterns, and the phrases of the accompaniment; in composition, the practicioners learn
their craft through listening and choosing the interesting auditory ideas of other music; in
a newspaper, the critical evaluation may comment on the circumstances of the performance
but usually also refers to the auditory impression as a marker of the performance’s quality;
in musicological study, finally, research is purported (by some) to refer only to the score,
but the choice of the research object as well as the researcher’s necessary persistence is
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surely aided and encouraged by affinity to the music gained through listening.2 While the
involvement of memory in all of these activities is widely differing (a few seconds only in the
coordination of dance-steps, as much as a lifetime in musicology), they require both auditory
perception of sound and its mnemonic retention. With due care, we can think of listening
and, by implication, memory as musical universals, or at least as close approximations of
such entities.
Listening and memory are not understudied subjects in musicology (conceived here to in-
clude all music-related fields of study, such as historical musicology, ethnomusicology, music
theory, music analysis, acoustics, music perception, or music philosophy); even a cursory look
at the literature reveals countless entries dealing with musical memory and with listening
under the heading of music perception.3 Most attempts to reach some understanding of the
complex processes that enable us to “do music,” that is, to perceive and enact it, to receive
and produce it, as well as to derive meaning from it, have set their sights on ways of partici-
pation that involve manifold influences—cultural, political, social, aesthetic—on the musical
subject, the listener. All of these influences are active in the present moment, as the listener
perceives the sounded object, but arose as conventions in the past, both in the collective
cultural past of history and in the individual past of the listener’s biography. To investigate
listening is to investigate a current process, but one not easily defined and distinguished
from the individual’s and her culture’s past. Perceptional analyses and experiments give
perhaps too much weight to the present-ness of perception rather than the past-ness of the
musical conventions guiding perception. Conversely, musicological discussions and analyses
2In general, it might be more challening to come up with musical activities not dependent on listening.
Being a historical musicologist myself, branches like paleography and the physical study of musical scores
come to mind. Yet, the comparison of notation styles is usually motivated by a problem evident only in
music sound and, hence, checked by reference to music sound, be it the practical interpretation of Carolingian
neumes, or the time of origin and historico-cultural circumstances of a piece by Mozart which allow us to
reason for its place in the development of Mozart’s understanding of sound. In both cases, classifying
the physical research under a concern about sound may not do justice to the expertise and interest of the
researchers but it probably reflects the thinking and desires of the “average musicologist” (an ideal as difficult
to fathom as the “ideal listener” required by some methods of music analysis).
3Apart from the sources mentioned later, Candace Bower’s articles “Memory and the Perception of
Rhythm” [Music Theory Spectrum 15 (1993): 19-35] and “A Cognitive Theory of Musical Meaning” [Journal
of Music Theory 44 (2000): 323-379] offer two exciting attempts. My path diverges from hers for two reasons:
my interest in continuous processes like listening favors a different view of memory as a basis; and her focus
on bodily experience as generator of meaning is difficult to match with my more intellectualized, language-
based approach. Also, from a neuropsychological point of view, the theory of memory she adopts, multi-store
models, is not without its problems; the eighth chapter will give a detailed review.
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of a piece in terms of cultural and historical criteria often focus on the general characteristics
representative of a style only, to the detriment of gaining insights about the individual rele-
vance of these characteristics on the listening experience. This study attempts to go what I
consider the middle way, on one hand appealing to experimental results and projecting them
onto the putative intellectual processes within a listener’s mind, on the other hand grappling
with the divide between past and present that is so easily and naturally overcome in any
act of listening yet confronts us as such a formidable intellectual boundary when we think
about thinking about music.
These two objectives informing my study will also inform how I restrict the definition of
“musical meaning” for my purposes. As mentioned, the term “memory” plays a large role in
musicological literature nowadays. Here, I restrict its meaning for music to neural processes
whose results are measurable and to neuropsychological theories whose predictions are exper-
imentally verifiable. This adoption of the neuropsychological definition into a musicological
environment necessitates a more detailed exposition of what neuroscientists have discovered
about memory and its quirks, to be provided in the eighth chapter. I will describe discoveries
illustrative of problems in neuroscientific interpretations of memory adopted into musicology
and different interpretations I integrate into my own model of listening and musical memory.
This very limited interpretation of “memory” requires me to find an analytical represen-
tation of music capable of producing musical units conducive to manipulation as neuropsy-
chological units of memory. The field of music semiotics offers two approaches, based on
the theories of Saussure and Peirce, both of which have already been applied in the analysis
of music and both of which, with certain modifications and caveats, are applied here. The
modifications wrought on music semiotics are, incidentally, forced by the second objective
described above, the communication of past and present in the listening process.
Temporality is hence, next to memory, the second concern of this study. While memory
is here assumed to be effective primarily in the domain of the individual’s mind, temporality
represents the quintessentially independent factor in human musical perception. However,
memory transgresses its domain as it becomes manifest in music composed and historically
transmitted, thereby being subject to temporality. Temporality, on the other hand, is effec-
tive both in large-scale historical processes and in the ordering of musical instances regarded
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and processed by individual memory. The two primary informants and determinants of what
I here consider musical meaning overlap and merge; my task will be the calibration of their
relationship such that an interesting and stimulating methodology arises.4
2.2 RESEARCHING LISTENING PRACTICE
Before I turn to the first formal step of this inquiry, a description of the semiotic method,
an example of the effects of listening and memory on the individual human mind might
illuminate my point. Proposing new theories about listening is a fair business but proposing
a new practice of looking at musical processes seemingly quite familiar will perhaps provide
a necessary jolt for our analytical minds, an awakening from the dogmatic slumber of current
musical analysis.
From the definition of listening as the perception and mnemonic manipulation of sound,
the realization dawns that we ourselves are certainly capable of listening. Hence, it should
be illuminating to study our own response to music. Instead of asking how a listener reacts
to music, we shall ask here: How do we react to music? How do we remember it? The
resultant picture will not be objective, but (if the inquiry has been well framed) it may be
representative of human listening practice.
In our informal memory experiment, the test case will be the ritornello of BWV 1046/1.
My reasons for choosing the piece are partly practical—the piece will be my main example
for the semiotic segmentation of music and its shortcomings when applied to memory—and
partly sentimental; thinking about ritornello structure in the Brandenburg Concertos and
evaluating current theories against my own instincts and memories led step by step to the
theory exposed in this paper. I will discuss the complications of the first movement under
the banner of ritornello theory later; here, we shall focus on a simple question: after listening
to the movement for many times in the past few years, what am I able to recall?
Figure 1 is a representation of the melody I remembered after not having heard a record-
4The problems inherently presented by temporality were the reason for postponing a detailed discussion
of memory to the latter half of this paper. Only when the analytical representation is aligned with temporal
concerns do I proceed to outline memory and the interpretation which forms the core of my account of the
listening process.
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Figure 1: Remembered Melody from BWV 1046/1
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ing or performance of the music for at least three weeks. (The writing out of this memory
trace happened in Fall 2003; since then, I have again listened to the movement but my
results, at least for the purpose of this demonstration, would not be much different.) The
general procedure for preparing Figure 1 started with the writing down of notation symbols
thought appropriate, followed by aural checks of the notated melody, repeated many times.
Once the notated melody sounded “similar” enough to the remembered melody, it was con-
sidered mnemonically “accurate” enough. Correcting possible errors in parts of the melody
at that point would have caused changes resulting a greater inaccuracy of the whole.
The draft was prepared in a music notation program by directly entering the notes into
the measure-and-staff grid provided; visual memories may thus have had as much of an
influence on the final result as aural ones. Yet, the mistakes, for example, in the alignment
of first beats in the original and bar lines in the memory transcription, are themselves
illustrative of the successes and failures of memory. Of course, the likelihood of such cross-
reactions between aural and visual memory might be diminished by recording a sung version
of the memory trace, followed by a melograph transcription of the recording and a subsequent
analysis of the graph and a secondary transcription into staff notation. While the latter
method would have been more scientifically accurate, it would also have required more time
and equipment without contributing to my argument here or elsewhere.
Notably, I used two means of checking my aural memory against an aural version of the
notational trace: I played parts of the notated melody on an electric piano, and I used the
notation program’s instant replay feature. The latter technique of memory reinforcement,
in particular, revealed several aural flaws I found in the version presented here: the scalar
motions in m. 4 should sweep farther down and up and take up more time, the music in
m. 7 should extend longer and use other motives, too, and the insertion of the triplets into
the transcription is awkward. Again, calibrating the relations of these particulars to the
remainder of the melody would endanger the relative accuracy of the whole. Given the
strictures of having to produce a score rendering, Figure 1 represents my remembrances
of the initial few measures quite well and provides thus a basis for observations about my
mnemonic facility.
The transcription process already provides insights into the workings of memory. Cer-
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tain sections required much more time and multiple replays to be rendered with acceptable
mnemonic accuracy. Among these are mm. 3-4, mm. 8-10, and mm. 16ff. Moreover, the
effort of recalling the precise events following m. 18 proved to be so great that the tran-
scription was at that point terminated. I could have continued inventing melodic fragments
effortlessly beyond this point; my interest in mnemonic accuracy, in relative confidence about
the content of the transcription, sagged, however. I was not able to assign to m. 19 a precise
motive without feeling compelled to consider other, equally mnemonically valid choices.
Now I shall compare this memory trace to the compositional trace, that is, the score of
the first several measures in the first movement of BWV 1046 as it is available in a modern
edition.5 Figure 2 shows an extraction of the ritornello melody; I tried to correlate the
sections in Figure 1 that my own recollection focused on with corresponding parts in the full
score. Of course, my recollection switches quite erratically between different instrumental
parts, just as my attention veered from one instrument to another in the act of listening.
To aid comparison between Figure 2 and the original score, I noted the instrumental part
(violin, horn, or oboe) from which my memory image was likely derived.6
Vis-a`-vis accuracy, I would like to draw attention to the differences between the original
and the memory image, the failures of memory, so to speak. The beginning of the excerpt is
relatively correctly rendered but within m. 3 mistakes begin to show. The recalled image is
again relatively close to the score in m. 5, at the cadence of the ritornello’s first half in the
dominant and the beginning of the second half. In the middle of the second half (mm. 7-9),
the exactness of recall again begins to wander until we reach the last few bars (mm. 10-12)
where the rendering is again closer to the original (or better, to the score). After m. 14,
accuracy drops off steeply.
Curiously, the parts that took the longest time to remember also rate low in accuracy.
Equally remarkable is their coincidence with parts generally described as products of the
Baroque compositional technique of Fortspinnung.7 As an initial hypothesis for our inquiry
5Johann Sebastian Bach, The Six Brandenburg Concertos and the Four Orchestral Suites in Full Score
[New York: Dover Publications, 1976].
6The designation in Figure 2 of each staff as played by the violin is due to an error of the notation
program. A better representation, eschewed here for lack of space, would trace the memory image through
the full score and point out all instruments that could have given rise to the memorized melody.
7The explanation of the technique, as well as a general review of ritornello theory, will be given in the
fourth chapter.
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Figure 2: Extraction of Ritornello Melody in BWV 1046/1
11
into the workings of remembrance, we will thus take the stance that the measures before
and after cadences seem to be well remembered, and that Fortspinnung sections seem to
be badly remembered. Thus, our preliminary practical task will be to explain the former
phenomenon and to prove or disprove a causal connection between compositional technique
and mnemonic activity in the latter.
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3.0 SEMIOLOGY IN MUSICAL ANALYSIS
3.1 SEMIOLOGY
In principle, musical thoughts can signify music in two fashions, which in semiotics (whether
musical or general) are represented by two different approaches: language-based or not. In
the first case, the representation is one-to-one, where each musical meaning (usually a word)
has a specific musical reference (such as a motive or a section); each concept is attached to a
musical unit.1 Meaning and music are distributed as if in a dictionary. The first linguist to
study this conception of meaning with regards to language was Ferdinand de Saussure. His
ideas were in the mid-1950s applied to the study of culture and, eventually, to music.2 My
analyses and suggestions for the structure of the First Brandenburg Concerto’s first move-
ment in the next chapter will employ some methods of representation based on structural
linguistics, notably paradigmatic analysis. While this solves the problem of representing pu-
tative mnemonic structures, it does not provide information about which step taken at which
time is mnemonically preferable. The processual nature of listening is thus toned down in
a Saussurean semiotic account. In view of finding a semiotic model that easily allows neu-
1In my opinion, a musical unit can be anything that has influence on the definition of the associated
concept, not just a musical motive or phrase but also, for example, the situation of the music in its culture,
or related historical concepts that influence and form the present meaning. Traditional musical semiotic
analysis as presented here does not interpret the “musical unit” quite that broadly.
2Saussure’s founding text for the linguistic branch of semiotics (often referred to as “semiology”) is the
Cours de linguistique ge´ne´rale (1916) [current English translation: Course in General Linguistics, ed. Charles
Bally and Albert Sechehaye, trans. and ann. Roy Harris, LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1986]. The applications
of Saussure’s thoughts to extra-linguistic matters are often grouped under the heading “structuralism”;
Claude Le´vi-Strauss’s work in anthropology is the best known example. A very compelling application of
some of Saussure’s ideas to music can be found in Victor A. Grauer, “A Field Theory of Music Semiosis I”
[Eunomios 2000, available at http://www.eunomios.org/contrib/grauer1/grauer1.html]. I thank Mr. Grauer
and Professor Mathew Rosenblum for presenting me with a print version of this article in the context of
Professor Rosenblum’s seminar on musical semiotics.
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ropsychological propositions to enter my argument, I introduce a more differentiated view
of signification modes, based on the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, later on. That model
will allow accounting for temporal processes more easily.
Early music semiologists expressed an interest in what Nicholas Ruwet termed “explicit
discovery procedures,” that is, the inclusion of analytical decisions and their reasons in the
analytical project.3 Notably, such explicitness is absent in most culturally conditioned types
of analysis such as Schenkerian analysis;4 one knows what a phrase, a tonic key, or a set is,
and how it might affect the piece, before one approaches the music material. Unfortunately,
the movement towards the acknowledgement and founding of the analytical process stopped
short of inquiring into the possibility of defining paradigms, the analytical representations of
structurally salient musical units, from first (acoustic and psychological) principles. Usually,
an effective paradigm (effective in the sense that by its employment in analysis a structural
feature of the music is highlighted) will have been chosen due to the pre-formed idea that it
may be useful. In the course of analysis, a more fortunate or opportune choice of paradigms
may offer itself, leading to another round of paradigm characterization and renewed scrutiny
of the music.
The methodology of semiotic analysis rests on the theoretical foundation of musical sig-
nification in a tripartite model, expounded by Jean-Jacques Nattiez in his book Fondements
d’une Se´miologie de la Musique.5 Nattiez differentiates three kinds of signification processes
in typical musical signification: the poietic, the neutral, and the esthesic. The first, poi-
etic, encompasses all influences on the musical piece, including the composer’s work; the
second, neutral, represents the compositional trace, that is, the score, or a recording when
no notation is available; the third, esthesic, accounts for the reception and reception his-
tory of the particular piece. The separation of these three levels encourages analyses of the
3Nicholas Ruwet, “Methods of Analysis in Musicology” [trans. Mark Everist, Music Analysis 6 (1987):
3-37].
4For a description of the Schenkerian method, the reader is referred to Felix Salzer’s book Structural
Hearing: Tonal Coherence in Music [2 vols. New York: Dover Publications, 1962]. While the focus of
Schenkerian analysis on long-range listening and on the derivation of structure from the listening process
make it an inspiration for my own research, the methodological difficulties of meshing it with memory
research foreclosed a more intensive engagement in this paper.
5Jean-Jacques Nattiez, Music and Discourse: Towards a Semiology of Music [trans. Carolyn Abbate,
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1990].
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neutral level in the fashion of Ruwet and does not sacrifice the standards of the scientific
process demanded by Nattiez6 while allowing to factor into signification the production and
reception of the music. Analyses of the esthesic or poietic levels, not bound for structure
and not under the pressure to yield reproducible results, are free to employ any method the
analyst considers promising. For analysis of the neutral level, however, music semiologists
have developed a preferred method, paradigmatic analysis.
3.2 PARADIGMATIC ANALYSIS
The graphical products of structuralist semiological analysis most often encountered in musi-
cology are referred to as paradigmatic (or taxonomic) analyses. Paradigmatic analysis breaks
the music under scrutiny down into small but sensibly chosen fragments, called “syntagms,”
which are ordered according to their resemblance of “paradigms,” particular melodic or
rhythmic patterns that inform large parts of the melody of the piece in question.7 Normally,
paradigmatic analyses render the melody in a table whose columns represent the paradigms
and whose rows contain the occurrences of the syntagms in temporal order. Reading through
each row from left to right and row by row from top to bottom, the original melody can be
recreated. In a second step, borrowing from the linguistic methods of Saussure, successions
of paradigms typical to the piece are noted and a syntax is developed. Thus, the piece’s
melody may in fact be reduced to a formula or diagram denoting the typical succession(s)
of paradigms. Although the reduction to a formal logical expression is not often done,
generally paradigmatic analysis attempts to understand the rules of succession between all
paradigmatic sections of the piece.
At first view, paradigmatic analysis is the ideal analytical stepping stone for a project
that attempts to deal with the parsing and memorization of extended melodies (or conceptual
representations of these in the mind). However, both parsing and mnemonic representations
6For example, in his earlier article “Linguistics: A New Approach for Musical Analysis?” [International
Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music 4 (1973): 51-68].
7A very clear introduction to this method of analysis can be found in the fourth chapter of Jonathan
Dunsby and Arnold Whittall’s Music Analysis in Theory and Practice [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1988].
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of music pose problems that an analysis of the neutral level alone cannot answer. As we
shall see, remembrance imposes on musical phrases hierarchies inherent in the functioning of
human memory; sections of the music that seem to have the same importance in the score may
not be retained by memory with equal fidelity. To hear the same motive twice does not mean
that both instances are remembered equally well; to hear a succession of melodic segments in
the same structural part does not imply their equal importance in terms of either the part’s
or the movement’s structure in remembrance. Paradigmatic analysis thus suffers (at least in
the analysis of musical memory) from a strong reliance on the visual compositional trace and
the possibility to access the source, the neutral level, at the analyst’s convenience. This is
not so in the case of attending to a temporally limited, continuous performance. To develop a
way of dealing with music from the listener’s point of view, we will have to ‘juggle’ paradigms
in a manner compatible with the abilities and limitations of human memory of extended,
continuous processes. Hence, we need to consult neuroscientific research on memory before
we can proceed to semiotic analyses.8
Furthermore, the description of the analytical process above already suggested that the
discovery procedure may change; it is only natural that the analyst’s view of the piece
develops as he explores it. However, the trace of the semiotic analysis, such as a published
paper, often does not acknowledge these changes because they do not offer information about
the neutral level per se. But the changes in the process of listening to and analyzing the piece
are themselves significant (pun intended!) evidence for the ways in which a piece encodes
and transmits meaning. For example, certain structural features of a passage may only
become available to the analyst once she has listened to that passage for a number of times
(either thanks to the composer’s repetition of it or thanks to the replay function of her CD
player). Hence, traditional semiotic analyses often forgo parts of the semiotic process that
formed the analytical concepts in the first place, an analytical endeavor that leaves parts of
the discovery procedure implicit.
In contrast, we should pursue an analysis of the neutral level through our primary es-
thesic faculty, listening. Our sensory and intellectual experience of music through listening
8My attempts at the clarification of ritornello structure in the next two chapters are thus only preliminary
attempts; whether a semiotic (in the Saussurean sense) analysis of mnemonically created structures is in fact
possible remains to be shown.
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provides the foundation for memorizing it; the memorized music forms the basis for the
process we call “analysis of the neutral level.” It is imperative that the constraints of the
listening process be acknowledged, and that its influence be detected in the results of the
analytical attempts in which we have been engaged na¨ıvely for so long. Making all effects of
memorization in musical analysis explicit may not be practically viable (each hearing of the
musical example would have to be accounted for) but it could offer theoretical inroads into
music understanding. I posit that the definition of syntagms, that is, their partition from
other syntagms and their conceptualization through paradigms, while founded on features of
human memory, is actualized through intervention of categories not contained in the neutral
level but in older mnemonic traces. Therefore, I consider my project a neuropsychological-
semiotic one: neuropsychology contributes the more refined vision of temporal structure in
listening to music; semiotics offers a means of graphic representation, paradigmatic analysis,
and a terminology that can be applied to the more varied situations posed by signification
as a temporal process.
Regardless of the criticism expressed above, paradigmatic analysis can serve as a prac-
tical tool in the examination of musical memories. In the fifth chapter, I will suggest a
segmentation of the first movement of BWV 1046/1 based on the discovery above that Fort-
spinnung material is perhaps less likely to be remembered than initial or cadential material.
Even though paradigmatic analysis does not supply the reasons for the division into sections
or the forgetting of Fortspinnung material or episodes, it still offers a means of representing
the movement’s structure such that it may be more pliable to analysis of mnemonic pro-
cesses later on. Given that our discovery procedure does not derive from first principles but
takes large amounts of Western music theory already for granted, we will have to properly
introduce the most important theoretical issues before proceeding to tabulations and graphic
representations of a ritornello movement, a task accomplished in the next chapter.
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4.0 ANALYTICAL APPROACHES TO RITORNELLO STRUCTURE
4.1 RITORNELLOS AND EPISODES
The concept of ritornello, imported into instrumental music from the Italian opera aria, plays
the role of unifying and structuring element in many first movements of Baroque concertos,
among these the Brandenburg Concertos. Apart from its employment in opera and concerto,
the ritornello as a structural principle found its way into so many genres of Baroque music
that we may with some justification call it the primary means of temporal structuring in its
time.
Etymologically, the term “ritornello” designates small sections of music returning within
a movement;1 sections of the movement not identifiable as ritornellos are commonly called
“episodes.” While the compositional principle is thus very simple, its realization in temporal
structures provides ample challenge to the analyst precisely because the simple idea generates
a wealth of possible parameters to consider. In particular, the ways in which the listener’s
mind is familiarized with the ritornello’s melody and then follows it through the movement
can resemble an intricate maze, with resting points here and there, hints and pointers towards
the exit, obstructions, and possibly, a final resolution.
In concertos of the late Baroque period, the ritornello is defined as having three distin-
guishing characteristics: a recognizable theme, tutti instrumentation, and (at least in the
initial and closing ritornellos) tonal stability.2 The first is hardly surprising, given that re-
1The very earliest example of usage (from 1675) in the Oxford English Dictionary anglifies the word
as “Returnello” [Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition, ed. John Simpson and Edmund Weiner, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1989; accessed on 04 March 2004 through http://digital.library.pitt.edu/oed].
2Thus outlined, the definition can be found in many textbooks and articles, such as Martin Geck’s
“Gattungstraditionen und Altersschichten in den Brandenburgischen Konzerten” [Die Musikforschung 28
(1970): 139-152]. General information on ritornellos presented in this chapter has been taken from Michael
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turn is usually signified by repetition of the ritornello’s melody. One ought to note that
not all parts of the ritornello need to be equally recognizable and that, in test cases like
our earlier informal memory experiment, not all parts are equally memorable. Insecurity
about the identity of currently heard music and its status either as ritornello- or as episodic
material opens the door for the other two characteristics. The use of the ripieno section of
the orchestra is a hallmark of ritornellos in late Baroque orchestral music. Consequently,
a thicker texture of the music would indicate ritornellos and a thinner one episodes. Tonal
stability seems to be not so much a prerogative of ritornellos in general as of the initial (and
often the final) ritornello in particular. Straying from the tonic key, uncommon in the oldest
forms of aria ritornellos, was more likely in concertos but still unusual. Texture and tonal-
ity thus enforce the identification of musical material as belonging to a ritornello section.
Ideally, continual detection of textural and tonal cues together with the melodic line would
allow the listener to orient himself in the movement’s structure at will (at least regarding
his present position in a ritornello or an episode). However, the helping hands of ripieno
instrumentation and tonal closure can also obscure identification of a section’s structural
significance if they are used unconventionally.
Such unconventional use of texture and tonality makes the identification of the ritornello
in Bach’s First Brandenburg Concerto a particularly challenging task. A cursory look at
the score reveals that textural density decreases slightly in m. 3, as the horns drop out,
and that the music cadences in the dominant at m. 6/i. Texture in mm. 6-7 becomes even
thinner than previously; orchestration seems to adopt an antiphonal alternation between a
small subset of the orchestra (three or four instruments playing three melodic lines) and a
larger subset of the whole ensemble (six instruments joining the smaller group, adding two
more melodic lines). Textural density increases again from m. 8, with the continuous use of
the full ripieno and the re-entry of first one horn and then both, until the ensemble reaches
in m. 12 the strength it had in m. 1. Tonally, the piece modulates back to the tonic and
cadences in the tonic key at m. 13/i. This cadence is followed by antiphonal exchanges as in
mm. 6-7, but now involving the horns, too. The piece modulates towards the dominant again
Talbot’s dictionary article “Ritornello” [The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, 2nd edition,
ed. Stanley Sadie and John Tyrrell, London: Macmillan, 2001, accessed online on 03 May 2004 through
http://www.library.pitt.edu/ articles/database info/grove music.html].
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and cadences at m. 18/i. Only there can we discern an abrupt change of texture as would
have been expected from the start of an episode. Yet, surely the ritornello would not end in
the dominant key, and not after such a long stretch, involving several cadences, in the tonic
and dominant, already? Moreover, texture already suggested a possible move towards a first
episode in m. 6, and the grand finish towards the cadence at m. 13/i, a possible endpoint for
the initial ritornello, is offset by the almost equally grand continuation. Examining our own
analytical activity, we realize that the ruminations on texture and tonality in this paragraph
were based on multiple references to the score; such rechecking is not possible as one listens
to the movement. Practically, the two features we would expect to be our pillars of support
in fact obfuscate the identification of the ritornello and, thus, endanger our ability to find
our way through the movement as we continue listening.
I contend that the actual listening process, that is, the continual parsing of the movement
into sections and their alignment with the concepts ritornello and episode, is sufficient for
creating a mnemonic structure enabling the possible reconstruction of the movement in
an aesthetically satisfying (though not necessarily complete) form. I believe, though, that
the identification of ritornellos and episodes while listening does not primarily rely on the
continual detection of textural or tonal cues. Rather, the delimiting or disjoining markers of
initial and cadential motives serve to parse the movement and the succession of partitions
favors particular patterns of memorization in the listener’s mind, leading to hypotheses
about the nature of the currently heard section and the sections preceding and following it.
These hypotheses naturally change over the course of listening, leading to a processual rather
than a static account of ritornello structure. To characterize initial and cadential motives
from a listener’s perspective and to determine their role in the creation of a mnemonic
structure in the listening process is the practical analytical aim of this paper, an aim that,
to make it sensible from the point of view of musical analysis, we will have to found on
acute philosophical arguments. In the following sections, I will examine the roles of incipits
and cadences in the determination of ritornello structure. The inherently processual nature
of listening and memory formation will cause problems in the analysis based on the chosen
graphic representation. The philosophical arguments enabling a true processual account of
memory formation and an interpretation of the graphic representation in accord with the
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nature of listening will be postponed until after the fifth chapter.
4.2 CADENCES AND INCIPITS
Generally, we may define a cadence as music that (in the common-practice period) ends a
section of a piece. An incipit, similarly, may be defined as music that starts a section of a
piece. In multi-section pieces such as ritornello movements, both are (with two exceptions)
related sequentially: incipits follow cadences and cadences precede incipits. The two excep-
tions are, of course, the beginning and end of the piece in question: the initial incipit is not
preceded by a cadence (belonging to the same movement), and the final cadence is not prior
to another incipit of the same movement.
This working definition of cadences, incipits, and their relationships is of little use in
more sophisticated musical analysis, because it does not define a range of sounds and sound
combinations over which the terms “incipit” and “cadence” extend as designators. Hence, I
proceed to a more generic definition and from this develop criteria for identifying cadences
and incipits while listening.
The generic description states that a cadence is the “conclusion to a phrase, movement,
or piece based on a recognizable melodic formula, harmonic progression or dissonance resolu-
tion”; the term extends to cover “the [music-theoretical] formula on which such a conclusion
is based.”3 Given the voice-leading conventions of the Baroque style, dissonance resolution at
the cadence is subsumed to a large degree in harmonic progression to a stable (or temporarily
stable) chord, usually a tonic chord or an intermediate tonic chord reached through modula-
tion and preceded by its own dominant chord. The relation between harmonic progressions at
cadences and the melodic formulas used by the composer are critical to recognizing melodic
segments in a memory task like the one we assume listening to be.
In memory and recognition tasks, listeners seem to concentrate almost exclusively on
melodic cues; harmonic progressions or the coherence provided by placing music in a key are
3W. S. Rockstro, George Dyson/William Drabkin, and Harold S. Powers, “Cadence” [New Grove Dictio-
nary of Music and Musicians 3: 582-586, 1st edition, ed. Stanley Sadie, London: Macmillan, 1980]. In my
parlance, Rockstro et al.’s “phrases” are referred to as “sections.”
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of little importance.4 It would thus be tempting to disregard harmony and tonality in the
mnemonic analysis of music altogether. However, harmony does have an influence on the
aurally outstanding melodic line paired with it: it constrains the choice of possible melodic
pitches placed above each chord. In the majority of the musical piece, these constraints do
not sufficiently limit melodic possibilities to easily memorable pitch patterns. At a cadence,
though, in the last few moments before the reaching of the tonic, the typically limited
number of underlying harmonies and baroque conventions of voice-leading conspire to limit
the possible melodic shapes to just a few. Of these few, the composer can choose particular
patterns to repeat, creating handles for memorization.5 The same considerations about
limitations of pitch choices can be applied to the beginning of a phrase. Again, the number
of possible harmonies is limited (most likely to the current tonic chord to define the base for
any subsequent tonal developments), and the melody will elaborate on these pitches rather
than introduce prominent dissonances right away.
Tonality plays an equally oblique role in informing listeners’ expectations. Rather than
expecting any section to be in any particular key, the listener will notice whether or not
the current section stays in the same key and will base her decision about the section’s
formal function on this observation. Notice that these influences of harmony and tonality
are perceivable through listening to the melody only, without reference to vertical parame-
ters; harmonic constraints become evident in the choice of pitches, tonal constraints in the
approach to the final pitch of the section.
Having circumscribed the vertical limitations on pitches in the melodic material of incipits
4Irene Delie`ge et al., “Musical Schemata in Real-Time Listening to a Piece of Music” [Music Perception 14
(1996): 117-159]. Delie`ge presents experimental evidence for the assertion that harmonic cues are less likely
to be abstracted and memorized than melodic ones (which she calls surface cues); while musicians are more
likely to choose harmonic cues, even in this group melodic cues provide the majority of mnemonic material
(153-154). Similarly, tonal function helps the organization of stored or provided music material on the
putative timeline of a piece very little, even though musicians again make use of tonality a little more than
non-musicians (154-155).
5This indirect influence of compositional strategies like harmony on the memorability of a melodic formula
is not touched by Delie`ge’s observations. The importance of harmony for motive recognition is a result of
the historical process leading from monophonic music to Baroque conventions. Listeners of the Baroque
(and those of later times familiar with Baroque conventions by ear) possibly found melodies at cadences
easier to memorize because they shared with the composer common assumptions about how melodies were
supposed to behave in the vicinity of a cadence. At present, the chicken-egg question about the primacy of
a composer’s vision of harmony or a listener’s understanding of its implications for melody needs to remain
unanswered.
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and cadences, we turn to the horizontal limitations, the general criteria for a cadence’s or
incipit’s temporal extent. Generally, I assume an incipit’s beginning and a cadence’s end to
be unequivocally clear. The former will start on the first downbeat of the phrase (unless
this was partially or completely taken up by the final of a prior phrase’s cadence) or on an
upbeat preceding the first downbeat; the latter will end on the last beat of the last tonic
(or tonicized) chord of the phrase. These outer limits, dividing incipit and cadence from the
neighboring phrases, are of less consequence for memorization, however. More complicated is
the clear designation of inner limits, places within the phrase where memory may disengage
from the incipit or re-engage at the cadence. Given that structural judgements are passed
on the basis of recognizing melodic rather than harmonic cues, memory content will not
derive from the melody placed with the last chord or the first chord only; the snippets of
melody (often only a single pitch, especially at cadences) are too unspecific to be memorable.
Instead, memory content will range over the melody several chords, or several beats, within
the phrase’s beginning and end. What are the criteria for how far these melodic formulas
extend into the phrase?
Current theories about Baroque compositional practice do not help me solve this ques-
tion. Scholars like Laurence Dreyfus have promoted the Fortspinnung model as generative
process for the movement.6 In this model, the ritornello is divided into three sections, cor-
responding to the incipit, a section using the Fortspinnung process, and the cadence. The
process of Fortspinnung creates a melodic line through modified repetition of a motive; mod-
ifications may include sequencing, changes of minuscule parts of the motive (such as single
pitches), or chord changes.7 It would be fair to assume that memory neglects the repetitions
and latches onto the generating motive as memorable incipit. Similarly, the end of modi-
fied repetition and the occurrence of new melodic material before the cadence would incite
renewed attention. However, we cannot presume a priori that the listener is aware of the
Fortspinnung material’s lack of importance. Neglecting Fortspinnung sections outright, with
6Laurence Dreyfus, Bach and the Patterns of Invention [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1996]. Another current model for explaining ritornello structure in the same body of works, Jeanne Swack’s
“Modular Structure and the Recognition of Ritornello in J. S. Bach’s Brandenburg Concertos” [Bach Per-
spectives 4 (1999): 33-53] pays somewhat closer regard to considerations of listening and perception but shies
away from formalizing these ideas.
7William Drabkin, “Fortspinnung” [New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians 6: 725, 1st edition,
ed. Stanley Sadie, London: Macmillan, 1980].
23
little knowledge of the actually memorable cues in the currently heard music, might lead to
confusion later on; the listener should thus safely store the Fortspinnung at least for the
initial ritornello. In memory practice, this does not happen. My memory experiment earlier
showed storage problems in the Fortspinnung sections of the first few measures already.8
The process of Fortspinnung, thus, seems to be not a cause for but in coincidence with lack
of memorability.9
Which factors other than Fortspinnung procedure could indicate to the listener the end
of an incipit or the beginning of a cadence? We established that the melodic formulas, to
be distinct and memorable, need to extend beyond their starting or closing harmony. In a
cadence, the penultimate harmony (usually in dominant function to the cadencing harmony)
provides more time for a memorable melodic segment to unfold; often, the harmony in
question extends over the measure or half-measure before the cadencing downbeat. Often
but not always, the penultimate harmony coincides with a more distinguishable rhythm.
Quick passages of many notes with equal note-values are replaced by a larger variety of
note-values, often including dotted rhythms and grace notes or ornaments. In BWV 1046/1,
the preparation of the cadence at m. 13/i is exemplary: in m. 11 of the violin part, the first
beat contains a dotted eighth-note thrice longer than the previously predominant sixteenth-
note motion; it is followed by the thirty-second-note ornament on the third beat and another
dotted eighth-note on the fourth beat; the latter two ideas recur in m. 12, leading to the
otherwise unmemorable cadencing downbeat of m. 13. If our memory concentrated strictly
on the downbeat, this cadence would be forgettable; by ranging over the way towards the
cadence, the melodic formulas employed can become memorable signs for larger structural
sections.
Rhythm and harmony thus conspire to engage our attention towards the end of sections
by following compositional conventions. Similarly, the ends of incipits are signified by a move
away from the initial chord and an evening-out of the rhythmic motion. This may or may
8These were mm. 3-4, 8-10, and 16 in Figure 1; I still operate under the assumption that the extent of the
ritornello is not completely clear. Note the higher mnemonic accuracy prior to and after cadences, though.
9Probably, the relation between Fortspinnung as a compositional procedure and Fortspinnung as a
mnemonic sign is the same as between harmonic progressions as compositional trick and as sign for a
cadence. In each case, compositional choices and listening expectations support each other’s influence on
the music and questions about the primacy of either would be premature or misguided.
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not coincide with the beginning of Fortspinnung procedure; for my argument, Fortspinnung
is not a necessary condition for lack of memorability. Therefore, Fortspinnung parts of
ritornellos and episodes will be neglected; only incipits and cadences will become the basis
for tabulations and graphs of ritornello structure.
4.3 THE HALLMARKS OF GENERIC RITORNELLO STRUCTURE
The reader will have noticed that I was careful above not to provide a clear defining moment
for the ends of incipits or the beginnings of cadences. In each case, I assume that there
is some latitude in deciding which segment of the melody belongs to which part of the
musical section under scrutiny. This latitude allows for the listeners’s variable familiarity
with conventions of the music’s style, their concentration when listening to the piece, and
most importantly, differences in the performance attended to. If particular instruments are
stressed more than others, the listener will likely remember their melodic lines better. Hence,
different performances even of the same score may result in different memory images. Given
the general criteria for melodic formulas in cadences and incipits advanced here, though,
the temporal positions of both will be less arguable and, hence, the emerging perception of
structure less variable.
The variability of individual perceptions of melodic formulas in incipits and cadences
creates a problem for the designation of these formulas in graphic representations. (Instead
of “melodic formulas in incipits and cadences,” I will henceforth only use “incipits” or “ca-
dences.” The reader should remember that these terms now refer to stretches of melody, not
only to the initial or the final cadencing pitch.) In paradigmatic analyses, the beginning and
end of individual syntagms is usually very well defined; to presume such well-defined-ness in
representations of putative perceptions of incipits and cadences would be unfair. Neverthe-
less, incipits and cadences are clearly distinguishable entities, hence deserving of separate
labels. In graphic and tabular representations, I chose “Inc” for incipits, “Cad” for cadences.
Usually, these markers are followed by a label for the section to which they belong, such as
“IncD” for the incipit of section D. When measure numbers are desirable, for ease of reference
to the score, I decided to treat the two types of melodic formulas differently. For incipits,
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Table 1: Incipits and Cadences in an Idealized Ritornello Movement
Incipit Cadence
IncR CadR
IncE1 CadE1
IncR CadR
IncE2 CadE2
IncR CadR
IncE3 CadE3
IncR CadR
the measure number indicates the measure when the incipit starts (not counting upbeats).
For cadences, since the memorable portion of the melody happens before the downbeat of
the actual (harmonic) cadence, I decided to defer to memorability and chose the measure
number of the penultimate beat (or chord) of the cadence; the concluding downbeat of a ca-
dence designated with the measure number “7,” for example, thus actually occurs at m. 8/i.
(Cadences on a weak beat of a measure will be designated by the number of this measure.)
For reasons given in the previous paragraph, the extent of incipits and cadences into their
section will not be represented by measure numbers.
Armored thus with a means of designating the incipits and cadences in a ritornello
movement, we can now move towards the observation of ritornello structure. I will start
with a generic example to point out the primary features of the ritornello process and their
implications for memorization before moving towards our actual example, BWV 1046/1.
In Table 1, I have outlined the idealized structure of the movement type with a ri-
tornello (R) and three mutually different episodes (E1, E2, and E3). Measure numbers are
obviously of no use in this example. The incipits and cadences were put in separate columns,
arranged such that after each cadence a new row starts. Reading left to right along the rows
and down row by row, the original temporal succession of incipits and cadences can be
recreated. Ideally, the arrangement according to division by cadences should allow the easy
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IncR
CadR
IncE1
CadE1
IncE2
CadE2
IncE3
CadE3
4
Figure 3: Successions in the Idealized Ritornello Movement
identification of ritornellos and episodes, since these formal sections alternate, since they each
have identifiable incipits and cadences, and since the movement customarily begins with a
ritornello. As we can see, the idealized movement divides nicely row by row into seven formal
sections, with the ritornello repeating three times and the episodes interspersed. Drafted
along a line representative of the passing time from left to right, the movement would present
itself as
R - E1 - R - E2 - R - E3 - R.
A formulaic expression could be derived easily but would not elucidate the structure or the
problems encountered by memory.
In the tabular representation or the timeline approach, each incipit or cadence is clearly
situated between its neighbors. The choices that memory is presented with when recon-
structing the movement from the listening experience are not apparent. Therefore, I present
one other graphic representation which brings some of the issues in remembrance to the fore.
Figure 3 is a chart of the idealized ritornello movement from Table 1. The arrangement
of the paradigms in a clockwise circle in the order of appearance caused the least confusion in
the drawing of arrows; hence, it has been applied to all future figures of this kind. Paradigms
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immediately temporally adjacent to one another have been connected with an arrow in the
appropriate time direction. If one paradigm follows another several times, a number next to
the appropriately pointed arrow indicates how many times this succession occurred. I did
not specify the absolute temporal order of syntagms, numbering their occurrences for each
paradigm, because this information can be easily derived from Table 1 and because providing
the absolute temporal order obscures the problems that memory may have reconstructing it.
We can see that, in this overly simple ritornello structure, the succession representing the
ritornello (stretching from IncR to CadR) is the only one occurring multiple times. Just by
virtue of its repetition, the ritornello thus has prominence over the episodes and should be
remembered better than they. The connections from the ritornello to the episodes are less
clear. Notable is the structure of three intersecting cycles of ritornello-episode succession,
with the ritornello the point of intersection between the three cycles. But the exact order of
the episodes in remembrance is not evident. If this graph is indeed a representation of the
ritornello structure in memory, CadR may be followed by any of IncE1, IncE2, or IncE3.
Remembrance of the movement in the order presented in the score and in performance is
not a necessary result of listening. Assuming that remembrance takes place after a complete
listening, two possibilities seem more likely than others: either the last episode is recalled
because it is the most recent one, or the first episode is recalled because it is the one
immediately following the strongly remembered ritornello. Both cases are equally valid, given
what we know about memory of temporal succession. In fact, the likelihood of remembering
one episode rather than the other may change with increasing temporal distance from the
listening event. A final decision on which kind of remembrance is more likely can only be
made knowing the memorization process (that is, the listening process) and the external
circumstances (that is, the biographical distance from the time of listening to the time of
remembrance). The critical and least theorized factor is the process of memory formation
that happens during listening. As I do not have any data about this process available for the
idealized ritornello movement, I will now turn to a real example, the successions of incipits,
cadences, ritornellos, and episodes in the first movement of BWV 1046.
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5.0 RITORNELLO STRUCTURE IN BWV 1046/1
Guided by my private perception of the movement, Table 2 shows the thirty-one instances
I consider to be of formal relevance in the memorization of the movement. Conventions of
tabulating are the same as for Table 1; when several incipits followed one another before a
cadence, these have been listed in the same row. As previously, reading through each row
from left to right and row by row down, the timeline of the movement can be reconstructed.
I have avoided the “ritornello”/“episode” labels for now, simply using letters from A to E
for the different sections. The reader will note that I have decided not to apply labels
consecutively; CadE should be called CadD but, as it immediately follows IncE, I have
chosen to name it in accordance with the most recent new incipit. Measure numbers are
included based on the observations about the extent of cadences and incipits made above.
Hence, for each incipit, the measure number indicates the measure of the first downbeat; for
each cadence, the measure number is that of the measure before the cadencing downbeat.
My attempt to group the syntagms of the movement in different paradigmatic classes
depended on many decisions that could, under regular circumstances, be considered prob-
lematic. For example, the copiously identified paradigm CadC, first heard in m. 17, points to
one very obvious problem. (The reader is encouraged to engage the score.) CadC reappears
in guises that may be considered sufficiently unlike the original to warrant a separate label.
Characteristic for CadC is, in my opinion, the approach to the new tonic pitch C played by
the horn. At least in the recordings I consulted, the horn seemed the most outstanding part
and its pitches, therefore, became indicative of the cadence. In one of the potentially ques-
tionable cases (m. 47, identified as CadA), the second violin uses roughly the same figure as
the horn in m. 17, considered to be CadC. However, in m. 47 the first violin plays a slightly
higher version of the characteristic melody of CadA, doubled by the violino piccolo. Hence,
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Table 2: Incipits and Cadences in BWV 1046/1
Incipit(s) Cadence
IncA (1) CadA (5)
IncB (6) CadB (12)
IncC (13) & IncA (15) CadC (17)
IncB (18) CadA (23)
IncD (24) & IncA (27) CadB (32)
IncE (33) CadE (42)
IncA (43) CadA (47)
IncD (48) CadC (51)
IncA (52) & IncD (53) CadC (56)
IncA (57) & IncC (58) & IncA (60) CadC (62)
IncE (63) CadE (71)
IncA (72) CadA (76)
IncB (77) CadB (83)
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this syntagm has been relegated to paradigm CadA, not CadC. While this choice seems to
be the most sensible in my opinion, it illustrates that identification of any specific syntagm
as model for a paradigm as well as the subsequent recognition of any syntagm as an instan-
tiation of the established paradigm are quite dependent on performance choices. A different
performance or recording, with different stresses, might result in a different paradigmatic
chart. Furthermore, apart from performance issues, the example illustrates once again how
important the first occurrence of any paradigm (be it a cadence or a complete section) is for
the later structuring of the movement. Insecure memorization implies insecure remembrance.
Another problem is posed by the chosen differentiation between CadA and CadB. Could
we not consider them the same? My reason for keeping the distinction between the plain
and the embellished version of this pair is quasi-autobiographical. In the paper that formed
the source for this inquiry,1 I assumed that the two versions played a role in signifying to the
listener the fraction of the movement already heard. A short comparison of measure numbers
will show that CadA reappears after roughly a quarter and at the halfway point of the
movement, while CadB reappears halfway between the second and third appearance of CadA
and, obviously, at the end of the movement. I had hoped to interpret this succession as an
aural unfolding of the ritornello’s two-section structure at two larger scales in the movement
itself. Now, thanks to more research into mnemonic structures, I have become considerably
warier of such assertions. To assert unfolding as a mnemonic structural principle, we will
have to uncover how mnemonic structures are formed, a task only partially completed in
this paper. The distinction between both versions of the cadence has been kept, though we
shall consider the two paradigms sometimes as similar, at other times as distinct, depending
on the strictures of the argument.
Given the tabular representation of BWV 1046/1 in Table 2, we can perform a translation
into a graphic representation similar to that of Figure 3. Figure 4 does this. The conventions
are the same as in Figure 3 with one addition necessitated by the more complex processes
in BWV 1046/1. Double arrows (connecting two paradigms in both directions) indicate
separate successions between the two paradigms in both time directions, at one time the
second paradigm following the first, at another time the first following the second.
1Breuer, op. cit.
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Figure 4: Successions in BWV 1046/1
The higher complexity of the movement is not surprising but it may impede easy recog-
nition of the mnemonically important parts. The most common succession, occurring thrice,
is that between IncA and CadA; hence, we might consider section A to be the movement’s
ritornello. Comparison with the score reveals that section A, while starting the movement
and thus by convention part of the ritornello, actually cadences in the dominant (at m. 6/i).
Mildly put, a tonally open initial ritornello in the Baroque style would be highly unusual.
Hence, we are forced to consider section A together with the following section, B. The latter
does in fact move back towards the tonic key, cadencing at m. 13/i. But in terms of tempo-
ral succession, the connection between the two parts and the relevance of B is questionable.
The successions CadA-to-IncB and IncB-to-CadB both occur twice but so do many other
successions, for example, those connecting section E to the putative ritornello and those
connecting the ritornello incipit to what surely has to be episodic material (from sections C
and D). By force of number, the composite ritornello A-B does not convince. Is CadB, in fact,
remembered strongly as final ritornello cadence or does the ritornello’s two-sectioned struc-
ture de-emphasize CadB? We remarked already that the instrumentation does not change
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markedly until m. 18, so a listener might be tempted to consider section C on equal par
with section B, the changing tonality notwithstanding. And even if one were to proceed
with the hypothesis of continuous, strong connections as signs of ritornello material, what
mnemonic function would one accord to section E? Judging purely from the graph, it might
be considered a section of the ritornello although a listener would likely not come to the same
conclusion, having heard the beginning of the ritornello at the beginning of the movement.
As it clearly leads into the ritornello, we may well consider it a preparatory section. Would
this suffice to mark it as episode? The strength of connections seems to be one indicator for
the ritornello but certainly not the only or defining one.
The problems of definition are even larger when we look to immediate temporal succession
as a marker for putative ritornello and episodic paradigms. One problem looms in the
paradigms that we would generally consider parts of the ritornello: the succession CadA-to-
IncB, though occurring twice, is countered by a succession in the opposite direction, IncB-to-
CadA. If memory takes temporal succession as the basis for its construction of structure, this
double arrow would indicate conflicting information about succession and, hence, a possible
confusion of memory when called upon to remember the succession of paradigms CadA and
IncB correctly in a given situation. One might say that, in the mnemonic structure created
by the listener’s mind, these successions cancel each other out. Another problem caused
with regard to immediate successions arises in the paradigms assigned usually to episodes:
IncC is more likely followed by a ritornello incipit, IncA, than its associated new cadence,
CadC. Should we therefore consider it an episode, but the following section (IncA-CadC)
a ritornello? CadC, however, does not only end sections that could be ritornellos but also
others that are clearly episodes, for example those starting with IncD in the latter half of
the movement. At best, after considering several possibilities, we might say that CadC
has dual use as ending to ritornellos and to episodes. The only safe criterion for episodic
material seems to be “anything but ritornello material,” and this criterion does not allow easy
application while listening to the movement and trying to orient oneself in it. Judgments
about the dual nature of paradigms, like those made here, are possible only by virtue of
hindsight, an option not available during listening.
Two problems from the previous discussion, the likelihood of using a particular succession
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and the confusion created by mutually canceling successions, both point to graphic modifi-
cations that can be applied to Figure 4.2 While they will not resolve the central problem of
getting a grasp at the creation of structure in listening, they show that principles similar to
those in Figure 3 are at work in BWV 1046, too.
Where would explicit concentration on multiply occurring successions lead us, assuming
that they are actually lodged more securely in memory? This general idea has a scientific
corollary in memory theory in the model of information storage developed by the neuro-
physiologist Donald O. Hebb.3 Hebb suggests, in the roughest rendering, that mnemonic
connections are more pronounced (and remembrance eased if it proceeds along them) if they
are used multiple times. What Hebb originally intended to apply to the physiological reality
of nerve cells in the brain we may apply to the network of conceptual connections rendered
here. Assuming that repeated use will secure remembrance, we sever all successions that
are used only once, however important for the structure and for the memorization of the
movement they might be. The resultant graph is rendered in Figure 5.
Applying Hebbian principles to the idealized ritornello movement would leave us solely
with the ritornello. There, the ritornello is clearly the most stable section and, it seems,
the only thing worth remembering. Of course, in reality our memory does not work quite
as formulaic and it is more dependent on the passing of time than a simple deletion of all
singular connections, whenever their occurrence, would suggest. Yet, the simplified graph
for BWV 1046/1 offers some insight into ritornello structure and the limitations of graphing
temporal successions of motives as I have done it in the previous figures.
The apparent stability of the ritornello, obvious in the idealized example of Figure 3, is
reflected in the real example of Figure 5 by the stretch of paradigms
IncA - CadA - IncB - CadB,
all connected in order and occurring thus at least twice, in the opening and the closing
2In BWV 1046/1, the first twelve measures are conventionally considered to be ritornello material. Schol-
arly opinion is generally in agreement on this notion; for example, see Dreyfus or Geck, op. cit. Since we
currently evaluate the success of different modifications of the graphs on the characterization of the ritornello,
we will assume the identity of the ritornello as sections A and B known.
3The original presentation of Hebb’s ideas can be found in his The Organization of Behavior: A Neu-
ropsychological Theory [New York: Wiley, 1949]. A recent appraisal of Hebb’s role in the neurosciences is
R. E. Brown and P. M. Milner’s “The Legacy of Donald O. Hebb: More Than the Hebb Synapse” [Nature
Neuroscience Reviews 4 (2003): 1013-1019].
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Figure 5: Hebbian Simplification of Successions in BWV 1046/1
ritornello. However, the graph does not reveal anything about the paradigms’s order of
appearance. Section A and section B could have been presented apart from each other and
the connection between CadA and IncB could have been established at a third instance,
separately from the other two connections. Granted, it is not likely for such a complicated
process to happen twice (and a third time for the establishment of section A). However, the
grouping of the sequence of paradigms into a ritornello based on the graph would not be
acceptable without further, larger-scale clarification of successions. The movement would
need a second listening and a second round of graphing, where the focus is now not on
successions of paradigms but on successions of successions of paradigms. While this may be
an analytical possibility worthy of pursuit, it is not open to the listener who attends usually
just one performance and has to identify and order paradigms at first hearing. If one is
interested in a listener’s perspective, one should tailor one’s analytical method to the means
available to the listener.
Let us now turn to a closer look at mutually canceling successions. Given that they raise
confusion when interpreted by the listener in the act of remembrance, we might exclude
them on the grounds that recall only operates with unequivocally unidirectional successions.
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Figure 6: Unidirectional Successions in BWV 1046/1
Figure 6 is a simplification of the information on temporal successions provided in Figure 4,
having deleted all bidirectional successions.
Proceeding to an examination of the sections commonly considered the ritornello
(A and B), we can assign to either section a separate cycle of ritornello-episode interac-
tions (similar to the cycles in Figure 3 that lead from the ritornello to the various episodes).
Section A derives its power as a ritornello from interaction with sections D (observed at the
end of the above discussion of the movement’s beginning) and E. Section E is the most likely
to precede section A in its guise as ritornello. Section D has a somewhat more ambiguous
relationship, given that IncD both introduces IncA and follows CadA twice. Still, we can
establish a preferred cycle of ritornello-episode succession for section A:
IncA - CadA - IncD - CadC - IncE - CadE - IncA - CadA.
Similarly, section B has an episodic equivalent in section C. Here, the cycle is as follows:4
IncB - CadB - IncC - (IncA -) CadC - IncB - CadB.
4In cases where the actual occurrences of neighboring paradigms (such as IncC and CadC) are separated
by incursion of another paradigm (such as in the common sequence IncC-IncA-CadC), I suggest that remem-
brance will preferably reconstruct the succession from IncC through CadC, regarding IncA as distracting
material. This assumed, the interspersion of IncA does not threaten the identification of section C as episode.
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Both cycles of ritornello-episode interaction share CadC, and the cycle involving section B
has at least a tendency to lead towards the cycle involving section A (note the alternate
connections from CadC and CadB to IncE), thus confirming A as a gravitational center of
the complete ritornello structure.
If we apply to Figure 6 the same Hebbian premise as to Figure 5, we arrive at a sparse
structure in which sections B and C are isolated, while sections D and E are still defined
in their episodic character through direct association with the ritornello section A. (The
graph has not been prepared; the reader is invited to make his or her own sketch by deleting
all single connections in Figure 6.) Although we might consider Section B a part of the
ritornello based on evidence in harmony (returning to the tonic) and texture (returning to
the full texture of the beginning), its isolated position with respect to both episodic and
other ritornello material make it a more problematic part of the movement’s structure than
could be gathered from studying the score. Yet, its strong presence in the recalled initial
moments of the movement in Figure 1 provides ample evidence that section B, by likelihood
of recall, is not distinguished from the structurally clear ritornello of section A. Therefore,
the arguments that led to the simplified version and its elucidation of structure cannot be
transferred into the domain of arguments for or against a certain listening practice.
The outlined confusions and observations, while perhaps having been overdramatized to
make a point, do not harken well for a general definition of ritornello and episode based on
the graphs and tables examined. The figures are a representation of temporal succession
of motives in the movement congruent with that of any score. The modifications according
neuropsychological theories like Hebb’s did not change the methodology, they only inter-
preted the results. While discarding Fortspinnung material and avoiding ambiguous motivic
successions, we are still fundamentally involved with a representation that could be derived
from the neutral level according to Nattiez-style semiotics. Under the influence of memory,
not all successions of material are equal, and the criteria for more and less important syn-
tagms, vulgo memorable and forgettable motives, still need establishing. The filter of the
esthesic level, our listening and memory formation process, has so far only helped paring
down the material. It has not been involved in the structuring of the material into a coherent,
memorable whole.
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Paradigmatic representations of ritornello structure as in Table 2 have a central flaw:
they do not simply present paradigms but a concatenation, or superposition, of types of
paradigmatic relations. The first type of relation operates on the scale of sections, ordering
the parts of each section (incipit, cadence, and other not explicitly memorable material) into
a succession of motives. The second type of paradigmatic relation governs the scale of the
complete ritornello movement, ordering its parts (ritornellos and episodes) such that after
completed listening the ritornello structure of the movement is represented and ready for
remembrance in the listener’s mind. Neither paradigmatic relation creates “ritornello struc-
ture” (the graphable component of structure) or “ritornello process” (the changing opinion
about structure formed in the process of listening) by itself. Rather, both paradigmatic
relations, by determining the succession of paradigms on their temporal scales, conspire to
inform the listener’s mind as she proceeds through the movement. Only gradually does a
representation of the structure emerge from calibrations between the two scales and their
constituent parts in the ritornello process.
Therefore, we should not attempt to elucidate movement structure through section struc-
ture as we did above. Rather, we need to determine how the paradigmatic relations of these
two scales interact during listening. To this goal, paradigmatic analysis and Saussure-based
music semiotics cannot contribute.
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6.0 PEIRCE - BEYOND LINGUISTICS
The problems of analysis outlined in the previous chapter convince me that semiology, at
least in the guise of paradigmatic analysis usually applied to music, does not provide a
terminology variable enough to accomodate the manifold ways of signification possible in
mnemonic processes. In Saussure, the primary signification relation exists between the sig-
nifier (a language expression) and the signified (an object). This binary definition of the
sign relationship, transferred onto the time axis, would allow for discrete semiosis only, that
is, plain connections between sign and object of a lexical nature. A sign becoming asso-
ciated to an object (say, by preceding it and being fixed in memory as a precedent sign)
could only have one possible meaning; changes of meaning or double meanings would not
be easy to explain and the dependence of meaning on the temporal situation that we can
observe in our daily lives would necessitate terminological contortions. Hence, even though
my approach owes its music-analytical precedents to Saussure’s semiology, I will adopt the
terminology of another branch of semiotics that is more capable of dealing with extended
temporal processes; this version was introduced first by the American philosopher Charles
Sanders Peirce.
According to Peirce, a sign is “something that signifies something else [the object] to
someone in some way.”1 The way in which the sign signifies to someone Peirce calls the
interpretant; in the words of Turino, the interpretant is “the effect created by bringing the
1Peirce’s semiotic work appeared over a number of years in several papers, most of which are com-
piled in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce [ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, Bristol, U.K.:
Thoemmes, 1998]. The present application of Peirce’s terminology is based on the introduction given in
Thomas Turino’s “Signs of Imagination, Identity, and Experience: A Peircian Semiotic Theory for Music”
[Ethnomusicology 43 (1999): 221-255]; in the present quotation (222), Italics were omitted because in the
source the whole definition was italicized.
During the writing and revision of this section, Professor Jonathan Sterne’s explanation of Peircian semiotics
in the concurrently taken class “Music and Communication” was of great help.
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sign and object together in the mind of a perceiver.”2 In more pedestrian terminology, the
interpretant is the meaning of the sign with respect to object and perceiver.
The introduction of the interpretant into the signification process (which amounts ulti-
mately to an objectification of meaning) catalyzes an interesting phenomenon quite unthink-
able in the Saussurean model, semiotic chaining: Due to the fact that an interpretant may
itself become a sign in another step of signification leading to the involvement of another sign
and the production of a new interpretant, and due to the second fact that this process may
theoretically continue ad infinitum, semiosis may indeed involve more than just the relation
between a sign and its signified object, a plain, lexical, Saussurean meaning. In Peircean
semiotics, signs may acquire multiple meanings throughout the signification process and this
process has the temporal extent which we required earlier. The idea of chaining opens to
analysis extended processes that may include, for example, sets of historical events, the deci-
sions of individual members in a society, successions of musical events (my focus later in this
paper), or indeed any kind of intersection between these and other sets of objects. The tem-
poral extension of many cultural practices (one may think of rituals or ceremonies, or of the
transmission of cultural traits by teaching) and the encompassing of many divergent or even
contradictory impulses in one cultural action now become accessible to semiotic description
through a continuous process of signification, semiotic chains.
Peirce distiguishes between three principal modes of signification, firstness, secondness,
and thirdness.3 Firstness describes a signifier whose signified is not precisely defined and
whose meaning, thus, has yet to be determined; the sign can still mean anything conceivable,
barring, of course, limitations of perception and logic. Secondness represents the coalescence
of several firstness-signs into a compound experience, an event; an example would be the
space-time event as defined in relativistic physics; the coordinates of the event in the three
spatial and one temporal dimensions, as signifiers, coalesce to signify the event itself. Third-
ness is the lingual and lexical representation of the sign in a word (hence, signs of thirdness
are the equivalents of the Saussurean, lexical sign). These varied modes are, of course,
subject to chaining: the interpretant of a sign becomes a sign itself in another significa-
2Ibid.; Italics original.
3Turino, “Signs,” 231; however, my rendering of Peirce’s terms here has been heavily influenced by
Jonathan Sterne’s explanation (see above, note 1 on page 39).
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tion relation. Peirce assumes that each higher category encompasses the respective lower
one(s); the interpretants of firstness and secondness signs function as signs of secondness
and thirdness, respectively.4 A sign of secondness is equally a sign of firstness; events are
both compound signs and themselves unfixed signifiers. A sign of thirdness (that is, a word
or concept) is both a compound sign (of the phonetic values and the associated meaning),
and a signifier that may come to signify a separate and different signified (for example, when
a word is dissociated from its accustomed meaning and used as a metaphor).
By applying these three basic modes of signification to signs themselves, to the sign-object
relationship, and to the interpretant, Peirce arrives at a highly structured philosophical
view of perception, signification, and thought-expression, respectively, where each of these
means of interacting with one’s environment has its own firstness, secondness, and thirdness
categories. It suffices for my exercise to mention the most commonly used, second of these
trichotomies, that of icon, index, and symbol. Iconic sign-object relations imply that sign and
object are connected because they share the same contingent reference space: an iconic sign
has the same general features as the object to which it refers. Indexical signification implies
a causal or coincidental relationship between sign and object: the sign and its reference
are connected through temporal co-occurence (which, to remind ourselves, is David Hume’s
interpretation of causality). The third, symbolic relation is purely conventional: a succession
of phonemes or letters is associated with a particular concept.
Peirce’s structured (though not primitively structuralist) exposition of semiosis allows a
wider range of objects to be considered significant and averts some troubles of the Saussurean
approach. For example, signs may now have multiple meanings. Although the Saussurean
model did not exclude this possibility explicitly (there are, after all, several meanings listed
for many words in, say, the Oxford English Dictionary), the implication was that the dis-
crepancies were historically (diachronically) or culturally (synchronically) caused and that
they implied (and necessitated) the existence of a root signification (that is, a primary as-
sociation of sound and object) from which the modern meanings derived. While this may
very well be the case in most languages, musical signs (however one would wish to define
these as a category) are notoriously difficult to fix. Turino points to the multiplicity of
4Ibid., 232.
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meanings assignable to an object through repeated indexical signification.5 A specifically
musicological advantage of applying Peirce’s semiotic theory is the possibility to account for
emotional responses to music as part of the signification process; Turino interprets emotions
as “rhemes,” interpretants in the mode of firstness (as immediate results of signification, not
consciously tied to a particular event).6 If firstness, secondness, and thirdness can be cast
in a temporal veil, even the listener’s emotional response could eventually be factored into
an understanding of music.
More to the point of music-historical inquiries, Peircian semiotics unravels the problems of
a popular model of communication that, if not explicitly, also finds its way into musicological
arguments: music is often seen as message that codes for meaning and transmits this between
its sender (the composer) and its receiver (the listener). Of course, this bears more than
a passing resemblance to Nattiez’s poietic, neutral, and esthesic levels of signification. If
we assume this model for the transmission of musical meaning, then encoding and decoding
have to observe a certain fidelity, which in nineteenth- and twentieth-century musicology
was ascertained by the claim of privileged modes of encoding (authentic composition by
a privileged sender, the genius-composer) and decoding (by an experienced analyst or a
competent listener); the message was, of course, the ill-defined musical work. Today, we
hold that the will of the composer is no longer the only, or even major, influence on the
significative potential of music; and understanding music through the musical work, while
still a means of conceptualization in musicology, has become much less restricted to a class
of cognoscenti. Certainly, musical meaning is not restricted to well-educated, acculturated
listeners but open to all.
We are now armed with a terminology for signification that goes beyond the binary
model of signifier and signified with just a single kind of signifier-signified relation. One
vexing conceptual problem in the analysis of temporal succession in music is the relation
between musical references and time, and between the present act of remembrance and the
past act of listening which provided the references for memory. To clear the way for an
inspection of how these references are put to use in time (the actual process of memory
5Turino, “Signs,” 235.
6Ibid., 238.
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and meaning formation), we will have to identify of what general semiotic kind references
are. Only thereafter can we examine how these references are manipulated by the actions of
memory and which other signification processes play a role in memory formation.
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7.0 SIGNIFICATION AND TIME
To approach music (or any temporally extended happenstance) as a temporal phenomenon
influenced by memory, we need to define the nature of the units which are manipulated
by memory. This involves both their description and the characterization of their reference
space. Considering the semiotic bias exhibited in this inquiry, we should consider them
signs, with distinct referents and modes of signification (modeled on Peircean semiotics).
Considering that they are signs, they will signify something, an object (or a set of objects)
we call the reference space of temporal succession. Our present quest will thus be directed
towards a feasible signification process for the creation of the temporal construct upon which
we base meaning. In the reference space created by this basic signification process, three
conditions ought to pertain: (i) we ought to be able to distinguish signs from each other and
from their referents; (ii) we ought to be able to identify and differentiate between iconic,
indexical, and symbolic signification relations acting upon those primary signs; and (iii)
given our desire to analyze temporal successions, we ought to be able to distinguish between
before and after, to establish the order of temporal instances unequivocally.
An innocent adaptation of the third requirement, and the old adage that music is an art
happening in time, may suggest time as the primary reference space of temporal signification
in music. Time is usually considered by us to be an irreversible, continuous process. Ide-
ally, irreversibility (or unidirectionality) ought to allow the designation of before and after.
However, once we try to define signification in this particular continuum, the two concepts
of time and sign will collide. As we shall see, time has only a very limited influence on
temporal signification and only very specific ways of signification are capable of providing
the constituent units of memorization, the substrate of remembrance.
The central problem for the identification of the reference space with time itself is time’s
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nature as a continuum. Once we assume a continuous reference space, the distinction between
iconic and indexical signification becomes blurred. An icon, we remember, is a signification
relation where sign and object share the same reference space. Sign and object coexisting
in time are thus, undeniably, iconically bound. Yet, given that they coexist temporally, we
might with the same justification consider them indexically signifying. And if we separated
them, assigning to the sign a particular time and to the object another, they would cease
to share the reference space, being neither indexical nor iconic. As we required distinction
between signification relations, and as time as reference space wreaks havoc to this distinction
(at least if applied na¨ıvely), we seem to be better off without a temporal continuum rather
than with it, regardless of our interest in temporal succession. Our reference space needs to
be discrete.1
Discreteness as fundamental feature of the reference space implies that iconic signification
did not create the reference space in which it signifies; iconic sign-object relations act only
upon signs and objects already provided by previous signification relations. Iconicity, thus,
does not create the initial segment of a (temporal) semiotic chain.
Having precluded iconicity as provider of the reference space, we turn to indexicality.
Discreteness does not preclude indexical signification, which relies on the co-occurrence of
sign and object, that is, their simultaneity. Yet, the perception of simultaneity is being
created only once both events have happened and have been perceived. The two events
conceptualized as having happened “at the same time” have, in fact, been perceived at
different temporal instances; their simultaneity resulted from a mental process that associates
the two events with the same temporal marker (usually chosen from one of either event’s
temporal occurrences). In a strict sense, rather than having happened or even having been
perceived simultaneously, the two simultaneous events are actually remembered as having
happened simultaneously.2
1It bears well to remember that all concepts we employ in the language description of music (as well as
any signification process rendered in language) are discrete at heart. Note, melody, and piece all refer to
temporally bounded concepts. The same may be said of more general terms such as “the Baroque period.”
As regards diachronic concepts, like genre, or the concept of time periods as such, their applicability is
implicitly connected to an extended time, too. We may be able to define “genre” such that it applies to all
types of human musical actions known to us, but even then the concept would fail to include pre-human
times. In short, any concept has a temporally limited period of applicability, and it will eventually fall out
of fashion.
2Curiously, what applies to simultaneity also applies to its lack, to temporal distance. Temporal distance
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The very process whose workings we wish to observe already needs to be employed to
furnish indexical signification. Indexicality, thus, is an equally unlikely candidate for the
creation of memory’s constituent units.
At this point, we might ask what we imagine the constituent units of temporal succession
to be. The signification relations creating memories mediate between two kinds of signs,
things happening (for example, a ritornello being played and conceptualized as such) and
instances when the things happen (which allow temporal ordering). Both of these kinds
of signs are part of the reference space and both need to be signified by the fundamental
signification relation providing the reference space. Neither indexicality nor iconicity have
been shown to work; both are already too dependent on fundamental, temporally ordered
input, too dependent on the existence of references that are (always?) already there. The
least problematic solution to signification may thus be the plain, idiosyncratic declaration
of certain input as instances or happenstances. This process of labeling is purely linguistic
in that it does not need to fulfill any conditions to be effective. Of course, we might prefer
labels that are sensible with respect to what we know already, but previous knowledge is
not required. The labels need to be lingually viable (that is, one ought to be able to put
them in speech) because they would otherwise prove unwieldy to discuss in a speech-based
rendition like this.3 The labeling process, though not dependent on a previously established
vocabulary, is, in terms of the distinction made by Peirce, one of symbolic signification.
As the reader has probably noticed, there is some friction between the Peircean definition
of symbolic signification and its present widening to designate the process of creating a
reference space of temporal signification. Peircean semiotics limits symbols to lexical signs,
words which have an agreed-upon, stable meaning. Yet, the labeling process taking place
becomes effective only between already established references; remembrance of the earlier instance must
become active simultaneously with (or after) the later one. Thus, temporal distance is itself a product of
remembrance.
3It is in fact here that the linguocentric bias of musicology characterized by Charles Seeger comes mini-
mally and unavoidably into play [“Systematic Musicology: Viewpoints, Orientations, and Methods,” Journal
of the American Musicological Society 4 (1951): 240-248]. Support for the role of language in understanding
and conceptualizing music is lent by recent neurological research by Aniruddh D. Patel, suggesting that
language and music are perceived differently but share what he terms the feature of structural integration
of new information thanks to a shared ability to integrate this information based on syntactic prediction
[“Syntactic Processing in Language and Music: Different Cognitive Operations, Similar Neural Resources?”
Music Perception 16 (1998): 27-42].
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within a remembering person’s mind is not unlike that. The meaning of the instance or
happening as labeled changes when it is taken up into other signification processes, but
this does not refute the initial validity of an arbitrarily assigned label. The label may get
displaced, but its initial service as marker for the external item, be it a temporal instance
or an extended event, does not loose importance. Nor does the condition that the label
be lingually viable (expressable in terms of speech) imply that it necessarily needs to be
expressed or, in fact, is at all expressed. Most likely, it gets replaced by a different label,
more appropriate to whichever standards the perceiver wishes to apply. The original labeling
is thus forgotten. However, this does not exclude the possibility that the original label can
be lingually expressed. This specific characteristic of symbolic labels as they are applied in
our case I shall call “referentiality.” Referentiality designates not the actual but the possible
lingual rendering of a sign.
Based on the previous discussion we are now able to assert that our reference space, the
stage on which other signification relations play their part in memory formation, is best de-
fined as a symbolic construct, parsed into instances and thus discrete. This realization bears
two implications: (i) Other than through suggesting direction, that is, a notion of before and
after and the fact that the two are not interchangeable, the unidirectional continuum time
does not contribute to the reference space and, thus, to meaning formation. Simultaneity
and temporal distance, as well as all happenstances in the reference space, are results of sig-
nification immanent to the perceiver. (ii) The referents of the labels for happenstances and
temporal instances must themselves have been constructed (at some earlier point) through
reference; in effect, they are links in a semiotic chain. Labels and referents are thus tem-
porally divided by virtue of happening at different times. The reference space within which
temporal meaning formation takes place is discontinuous by virtue of the process of meaning
formation itself. All entities serving as signs and objects are capable of serving as such by
virtue of their resulting from a prior signification process. In a sense, the process of temporal
signification creates the unique reference space in which it can most easily function. The
substrate and the result of meaning formation is the same.
The assertion that the substrate/result of temporal signification, or meaning formation, is
a symbolic reference space with potential verbal references to each member has consequences.
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Given that we search for ways of signification responsible for meaning formation, not for its
presentation or preservation, it follows that symbolic signification does not contribute to
temporal meaning formation and, by extension, to the process of remembrance. The units
of memory are (at least according to our definition of the reference space) symbolic but they
do not create meaning, they only preserve and confer it.4 Referentiality (the potential of an
object to be referenced by a word) is a convenient result of temporal signification but not
what drives it. Indexical or iconic signification are more likely candidates for this honor.
To infer how memories are formed, we cannot rely on linguistic concepts alone but need to
appeal to neuroscience.5
To reiterate the two major results of the previous discussion, time and symbolic signifi-
cation do not play a role in the memory formation process as such. However, both supply
basic notions, the former of process, the latter of unit; furthermore, symbolic signification
will figure significantly in the storage of concepts outside the memorization process. First,
though, we shall scrutinize remembrance of word lists because here we are supplied with
data and theoretical underpinning. Only then will we proceed to point out the differences
to the musical case.
4It follows that symbolic references are incapable of changing their meaning; the changes of meaning we
observe in everyday language use are due to meaning formation using the old referent.
5In a sense, we are by the nature of our approach, by its linguocentrism, never quite allowed to witness
the processual aspect of memory formation; the best we can achieve is the detection of a minuscule difference
at a significant place within the mnemonic structure; the difference suggests that memorization has taken
place.
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8.0 MEMORY
8.1 THE STANDARD VIEW OF WORD LIST MEMORY
Having laid a terminological and analytical foundation with our excursion into semiotics,
let us now proceed to a closer examination of the characteristics of memory. Musicological
treatments of the topic are now common and surveys of the basic theories are available to
musicologists.1 I will first review the current state of research with a focus on something
similar to melodies in structure: word lists and the features of their recall from memory.2 In
the description of methodology and results, I will make frequent reference to some technical
terms which I have italicized where they are defined. The reader may also be cautioned that
neuropsychology has a weakness for acronyms, a trait I have adopted in a few cases.
Let me first describe a typical experimental setup (the reader may refer to the timeline
1A general survey is given by Bob Snyder’s Music and Memory: An Introduction [Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 2000]. More specific reference to neuropsychological theories can be found in the articles of
Candance Bower, op. cit., and in William L. Berz’s “Working Memory in Music: A Theoretical Model”
[Music Perception 12 (1995): 353-364]. All of these expository or theoretical accounts deal with memory
as a multi-store system, a memory model I describe below but circumvent in lieu of what I think is a more
acute and experimentally correct description.
2The material for this section is based to a large degree on my memories (indeed!) of a course in
neuropsychological models of memory taught in Fall 2000 at Brandeis University by Michael J. Kahana.
Reference will be made to the course material in its present incarnation (for similar course taught in Fall
2003), “Foundations of Human Memory” [course material for Npsy 137b, Brandeis University, 2002, available
at http://memlab1.ccs.brandeis.edu/∼kahana/Courses/Npsy137/, last accessed 15 November 2003]. Quite
obviously, the present version is a work in progress; the third chapter (“The ‘Modal’ Model”) has the most
complete exposition of facts I use for my argument, while Chapters 6 (“Association”) and 7 (“Sequence
Memory”) contain other pertinent information.
Specialist literature central to my argument includes another source co-authored by Mr. Kahana with
Marc W. Howard: “Contextual Variability and Serial Position Effects in Free Recall” [Journal of Exper-
imental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition 25 (1999): 923-941]. In addition to Kahana’s “Foun-
dations,” the following two sources provide a non-specialist introduction to recent advances in neuroscience:
Conversations in the Cognitive Neurosciences, ed. Michael S. Gazzaniga [Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1997]; and Rodolfo R. Llinas, The I of the Vortex: From Neurons to Self [Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
2001].
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Table 3: Timeline of a Typical Free-Recall Experiment
Instructions
Rehearsal Item 1
IPI
Item 2
IPI
. . .
IPI
Last Item
RI
Recall Item A
Item B
. . .
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in Table 3 for a succinct list; times passes from top to bottom). After initial instructions,
the experimental subject is presented with a list of semantically unrelated words (the items)
at a specific presentation rate. During this process of rehearsal, the items are separated by
a constant temporal distance, the inter-presentation interval (IPI). After the last item, the
retention interval (RI) ensues which is often longer than the IPIs. Thereafter, the subject
writes down the items as they come to her mind (free recall), or the experimental supervisor
gives a cue item and the subject is asked to recall another item from the list (cued or
conditional recall).3 In either case, the researcher is free to vary the conditions of rehearsal
by asking the subject to take note of particular item features (such as similar sounds or
semantic meanings) or by filling the IPIs and/or the RI with tasks that are ostensibly not
related to the objective of the recall task, namely the remembrance of the word list.
Regardless of the quirks of the individual experiment, the results in examinations of free
recall are usually represented graphically as a function of an item’s position in the list. Of
course, one trial (or even several trials with the same person) does not yield statistically
meaningful data. Hence, recall tasks are usually averaged over many trials until general
patterns become discernible. Figure 7 shows a prototypical serial position curve (SPC),4
where the probability of an item being recalled by the subject is plotted against list position.
We can see that the highest likelihood for recall rests with the last few items, a feature
of memorization called recency. Perhaps surprisingly, the first few items are also slightly
more prevalent in memory (primacy). I offered a somewhat haphazard analogy of recency
and primacy with melody remembrance in the third chapter as impetus for my desire to
3In my extrapolation from the results of these experiments and their interpretations by neuropychologists,
I will start from the vantage point of free-recall tasks because I consider them to be closest to the way in
which musical structure is recalled. However, cued recall cannot be divided from free recall because the
only conceptual difference consists in the researcher’s control over presentation of the cue item: either it is
supplied by the researcher (in cued recall) or by the subject (in free recall). The differences and similarities
will become more obvious once we examine recall tasks and their influence on memorization later on.
4Given that the data collected in an experiment usually serve different purposes than a general expla-
nation, the trends I describe here are often difficult to discern in figures representing actual experimental
results. Therefore, I have chosen not to represent real data but rather idealized ones. Qualitatively, all curves
in this paper are based on actual graphs and I give the source graph and the quantity or situation chosen
in a footnote. This serial position curve is adapted from Kahana, “Foundations,” 32; here, I re-produce
qualitatively only the graph for immediate, un-distracted recall.
The reader will notice a similarity between the way in which we remember melodic sections (with the incipit
and cadence particularly well retained) and graphs like Figure 7 with high likelihood of remembrance at the
beginning and the end of the list. Noticing this similarity in my own recollections of ritornellos encouraged
me to undertake the research leading to this paper.
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connect music and neuropsychology. As we shall see, these two measures are not quite as
unproblematic as one would hope. But before I present more acute measures of mnemonic
activity, let me review shortly an explanatory attempt that reasons for data like those given
in Figure 7 quite well and has gained some traction in popular and musicological discussions
of memory: the multi-store model.
In the 1960s and early 1970s, when serial position data were formally presented for the
first time,5 neuropsychologists developed memory mechanisms to account for these data.6
The most famous class of models to emerge from serial position experiments in the late 60s
and 70s was called multi-store models.7 Multi-store models are based on the assumption
that memory consists of several different stores with different capacities, different abilities
to retain items, and different ways to remember them. The most successful single model of
this type has the acronym SAM (for “Search of Associative Memory”) and it was developed
in the late 1970s by Robert M. Shiffrin and Jeroen G. W. Raaijmakers.8 In principle, SAM
supposes three stores: the smallest (the sensory store) accepts any appropriate input, does
not retain any items for longer than a few milliseconds, and transfers them immediately to
the next two levels, short-term memory (STM) and long-term memory (LTM).9 STM has
a capacity of approximately four to ten items. Once it is filled and new items keep being
entered, old items get expelled randomly either to LTM or they are lost, that is, forgotten.
Recall from STM simply involves remembering the whole current content with approximately
equal probability. As this is assumed to happen at the beginning of the recall period, STM
is supposed to be mainly responsible for the strong recency effect observed in free recall.
LTM has an unlimited capacity and retains items indefinitely. In LTM, each possible
5For example, through Benjamin B. Murdock’s “The Serial Position Curve in Free Recall” [Journal of
Experimental Psychology 64 (1962): 482-488].
6Today, these models are usually cast in terms of a computer simulation that will (or not) yield resultant
serial position curves similar to the ones observed in vivo.
7The first precise description of such a model was given in Robert C. Atkinson and Robert M. Shiffrin’s
“Human Memory: A Proposed System and Its Control Processes” [in The Psychology of Learning and
Motivation 2: 89-105, ed. K. W. Spence and J. T. Spence, New York: Academic Press, 1968].
8“Search of Assocative Memory” [Psychological Review 88 (1981): 93-134]. The reader should note that
my description of SAM is quite simplified and skips over many randomizing steps included in the model to
make the results as similar to experimental data as possible.
9Because the sensory store does not retain the items after forwarding them to STM, it is usually considered
to have no influence whatsoever on experimentally measurable variables like retention time or probability of
recall.
53
pairing of items is assigned a strength value which is usually a function of the time the items
spent together in STM. In recall, a new item is chosen based on the highest associational
strength to a previously recalled item. It follows that items that per chance stayed in STM
together longer will have a higher likelihood of being associated in memory and being recalled
together. This mechanism explains the choice of SAM’s acronym, for “Search of Associa-
tive Memory.” Association between items in recall is thus strongly (but not exclusively)
dependent on their temporal proximity in rehearsal.
SAM assumes that STM is recalled first and thus explains the recency effect. The primacy
effect relies on slightly higher associative strengths of the first few list items. These items are
privileged because they were taken up into an empty short-term store and, thus, were not
under the immediate danger of being expelled. Therefore, they have stayed slightly longer
with one another in STM, which leads to slightly higher associative strengths for them. Their
recall is thus slightly more likely than that of items following in their step. Thereby, SAM
gives a plausible explanation for the shape of the serial position curve in free recall.
SAM explains basic results of recall experiments extremely well. Moreover, it can be
adapted to other memory tasks like recognition. The use of multi-store models for neu-
ropsychological accounts of memory is thus obvious and their importance has even been
acknowledged by public usage; terms like “short-term memory” have become common cur-
rency. It might thus seem tempting to adopt recency and primacy (as defined through models
like SAM) and apply them to things musicological. From the neuropsychological point of
view, though, several problems with multi-store models emerge: They are not aesthetically
pleasing because they use two different recall mechanisms for what ideally ought to be one
holistic phenomenon. They do not provide a quantifiable measure of association (neither
recency nor primacy are quite sufficient). Most importantly for an experimental science,
under certain conditions the predictions of models like SAM are not borne out by experi-
mental data. As we shall see, these different experiments, while challenging the multi-store
model, will provide us with more tangible if still metaphorical connections to the problems
encountered in music analysis.
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8.2 DISTRACTOR TASKS: SEVERAL PROBLEMS AND A DIFFERENT
REPRESENTATION
When talking about the general setup of free recall experiments, I mentioned the possibility
of introducing unrelated tasks into the IPIs or into the RI, so-called distractor tasks. In a
test of word list memory, a suitable distractor might be a task involving difficult calculations
by the subject.
If such a distractor task is posed in the RI, memory performance changes significantly as
can be seen, for illustration, in Figure 8 (on page 56).10 Recency vanishes completely while
primacy is retained. Primacy is a persistent feature of free recall, even when the end-of-list
distractor is extended. At first view, the clear division of the recency phenomenon from
the remainder of the list, and the researcher’s ability to control its appearance by specific
changes of experimental conditions, lends support to the multi-store model; there seems to
exist a close correlation between the activity of a limited-capacity STM and the observed
recency effect. The remainder of the serial position curve seems to be governed by LTM.
The problems of the multi-store model and the theories about memory on which it is
based become apparent when distractor tasks in the RI and IPIs are set into relation with one
another. Previously we only had a pronounced distractor in the RI, leading to a vanishing
recency effect. Let us assume the experimental conditions that lead to Figure 8, where we
had a much longer distractor-filled RI than IPI. If we now introduce distractor tasks in the
IPIs and increase their length, the shape of the serial position curve approaches again that of
Figure 7. The recency effect re-appears. Items already thought forgotten make a miraculous
re-appearance once the experimental conditions are changed.
In retrospect, the recency effect is strongest when the IPIs and the RI are of equal length
and it vanishes as the RI becomes much longer than the IPIs.11 We may thus think of recall
10Adapted from Kahana, “Foundations,” 32 and 35; here, only the graphs for extended end-of-list distractor
tasks were reproduced.
11The explicit presence of a distractor plays an obvious role. In regular experiments, the RI is usually
longer than the IPIs and, yet, recency is observed. However, distractor tasks provide a means of control over
what the subject is engaged in during rehearsal and recall. In the regular setup, the subject’s mind is likely
actively engaged in rehearsing the items, while a distractor task precludes that.
Another means of establishing control over the subject’s private rehearsal processes is so-called overt re-
hearsal, in which the subject is asked to repeat aloud the items as they come to his mind during the RI.
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operating similarly on different time scales as long as the relative lengths of the IPIs and
the RI are the same; this feature has been dubbed scale invariance and it seems to be a
consistent feature of free recall.12 Assuming scale invariance, we can differentiate between
two basically different types of recall applicable to memorization on all time scales: (i) Recall
undivided from rehearsal through either a distractor task or long separation; this type will
usually have similar-length IPI and RI and exhibit a strong recency effect. (ii) Recall that
is dissociated from rehearsal through a distractor in the RI and generally a much longer RI
than IPI; this type will exhibit little or no recency.
The reappearance of recency in rehearsal periods with longer IPIs has been dubbed long-
term recency.13 It agrees with scale invariance but problematizes the assumptions leading to
multi-store models like SAM. SAM relies on the non-associative retention of items in the short
term store until recall is initiated, explaining recency by the uncalibrated emptying of STM.
Since the distractor task in the RI should displace any items from the original memorized list
and effectively empty STM, recency should vanish, which SAM predicts correctly. However,
SAM cannot account for the reappearance of recency when the IPIs are also filled with
distractors and their length approaches that of the RI. In effect, SAM and related models
rely on the independence of the formation of mnemonic inter-item associations from the RI’s
duration. At least seen through the spectacles of a recall process divided into temporally
separate regions, one in which recency obtains and another in which associations obtain, the
multi-store model fails to account for long-term recency.
The solution to the apparent dilemma does not lie in a radically new model but, first,
in a different representation of the data such that inter-item association and recency are
examinable separately. Excepting the split between recency and pre-recency regions (which
depends on the experimental setup), temporally proximate items have proximate recall prob-
abilities; perhaps, a different graphic representation of the data could point us to the prob-
ability of recall as a function of temporal proximity. In the same vein, the importance of
recency in recall begs for a representation of recency alone, without the possible interference
of primacy and, especially, inter-item association. Howard and Kahana suggest representa-
12Kahana, “Foundations,” 48.
13Kahana, “Contextual Variability,” 925.
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tions of the data that fit these requirements by introducing two new measures.14
The measure of conditional response probability (CRP) indicates the likelihood of an
item’s recall given that another item has just been recalled. Figure 9 shows a typical dis-
tribution, with the lag to the possible next item as dependent variable (on the horizontal
axis) and the just recalled item in the center, at lag zero. We can see that close list positions
are more likely to be recalled together (a variant of recency may apply) and that recall of
future list positions is much more likely than recall of past items.15 This phenomenon has
been termed lag-recency by Kahana. Overall, the CRP curves give a resonably clear account
of the strength of inter-item associations and their dependence on temporal proximity. The
only unusual feature of the CRP is its bias towards recalling items following in the list.
The recall probabilities for end-of-list items can be measured more acutely through the
probability of first recall (PFR), the likelihood of any list item being recalled first. Figure 10
shows a typical PFR curve in which, unsurprisingly, the highest probability rests with the last
presented (that is, the most recent) item.16 Inter-item associations do not play a role because
the curve records the subject’s recall probability to only one recalled item, in particular, the
first one which cannot explicitly be associated with a previously recalled item.
Because we can think of free recall as an initial random (though recency-driven) recall
followed by conditional recall, the CRP- and PFR-curves represent the experimental data,
distracted or undistracted, as well as the serial position curves in Figures 7 and 8 above.17
Figures 11 and 12 show the effects of extensive RI distractors on the CRP and PFR represen-
tations.18 Distractors, depending on their length, have the same implications as described
14“Contextual Variability,” 924.
15Figure 9 has been adapted from Figure 3.5 (Avg) of Kahana, “Foundations,” 43; in cumulative accounts
like Kahana’s, forward conditional recall has a probability roughly twice as high as backward recall.
16Figure 10 is adapted from Howard and Kahana, “Contextual Variability,” 925, Figure 1. In my rep-
resentation, the general tendency towards recency evident in all recall curves for a specific item has been
emphasized; the actual experimental results are obviously much more varied. Interestingly, and perhaps
significantly for our enterprise, the experimental recency curves shown in Howard and Kahana’s article (ex-
tending as they do over the whole time range of rehearsal) show some evidence of hierarchy and parsing,
especially the ‘bumps’ in the PFR curves at the recency end; these ‘bumps’ exhibit the bathtub-shape of the
regular serial position curve on a smaller scale (just over two to five items). The higher recall probabilities
of the recent items seem to be more pliant to the disturbances. For a clearer (less ‘bumpy’) representation
of the PFR prepared by Kahana himself, see “Foundations,” 47.
17Howard and Kahana, “Contextual Variability,” 937.
18My Figure 11, the PFR, is adapted from Kahana, “Foundations,” 47. Figure 12, showing the CRP, was
taken from the same source, 48, left half of Figure 3.9.
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earlier. The effect of a strong RI distractor task on the recollection of recency items (as
represented in the PFR curve) is even clearer than in Figure 8: the graph becomes almost
flat. On the other hand, the lag-recency effect, our representation of associations, is not af-
fected qualitatively presence of a distractor or, more generally, the dissociation of recall from
rehearsal. This reflects the unchanging nature of inter-item associations in memorization
with respect to the specific recall task; regardless of the relative length of the RI distractor,
the list is conceived of and stored as one unit, its subunits being associated with one another
in the same contiguous way.
Nothing of what has been said so far excludes the possibility that contiguity and recency
are functional at different time scales.19 This option poses at once the question how recency
and contiguity interact when memories are formed and stored at different temporal scales.
For example, a particular musical motive may be the beginning of a phrase but the phrase
intermediate between two others. Is this motive going to be recalled with a higher probability
because of its rehearsal position in the phrase or with a lower probability due to the phrase’s
position in the tub between a primacy-phrase and a recency-phrase? Or, to twist the question
around and place responsibility on the situation of the recall task, which task would yield
the former result, and which the latter? The question bears out in neuropsychological
terms the concern raised earlier with regards to paradigmatic analysis: not all syntagms
of one paradigm are remembered equal.20 I suggest in the following chapter that a close
examination of the neuroscientific methodology from a semiotic perspective might suggest a
peculiar interpretation of the underlying mechanism21 of free recall, an interpretation that
19One theory of memory, invented to remedy the shortcomings of the two-store model, has more explicit
references to what is called ‘levels of processing.’ The proponents suggest that certain memories are stored
better because they are processed by ‘higher’ faculties of the human mind, which might be associated with
temporal scales. An exposition is given in F. I. M. Craik and E. Tulving, “Depth of Processing and the
Retention of Words in Episodic Memory” [Journal of Experimental Psychology 104 (1975): 268-294]. For my
project, I found Kahana’s more explicit examination of word lists and their temporal behavior more useful.
20The remark about ‘bumps’ in the PFR curves of “Contextual Variability,” 925, Figure 1, in note 16 on
page 58, may reflect precisely this plasticity of memory, its ability to hierarchize the incoming data and
reference them such that a necessary but not superfluous amount of information is accessible at any point
in time.
21One ought to mention that Howard and Kahana, in “A Distributed Representation of Temporal Context”
[Journal of Mathematical Psychology 46 (2002): 269-299], provide their own memory model that accounts
for long-term lag-recency and provides a simple explanation for the asymmetry of the lag-recency effect. I
have decided to cast my suggested theory in a less technical guise but their Temporal Context Model might,
with some more thought, also be applied to analyzing musical structure.
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will ultimately make the neuropsychological findings applicable to musicological and music-
analytical problems.
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9.0 TOWARDS A THEORY OF PARSING AND PARSIMONY
9.1 PRELIMINARIES
After the previous broad survey of neuropsychological descriptions of memory, let me now
turn to the philosophical reasoning that, in my opinion, would make these descriptions a
viable support for musicological research. To facilitiate my working-together of neuropsy-
chological and semiotic ideas in a musicological mould, let me first recount the salient points
recovered from either field.
In Semiotics:
• For the purpose of the description of music in lingual terms, all signs can be analyzed as
referential, that is, potentially symbolic.
• All signs of a referential character have clear positive/negative connotations, i.e., when
applied, certain objects are deigned to fall under them, others not.
• Iconic and indexical signs play likely no role in the creation of referential signs (though
they may play a role in the creation of these signs’ references, namely memories).
In Neuroscience:
• Each instance of engaging memory may be divided into three sections: instructions,
rehearsal, and recall.
• Instructions consist of referential signs, to be applied in the rehearsal process.
• Recall data may be analyzed as a composition of two different effects operative through
memory: recency (higher likelihood of remembrance for recent items) and contiguity
(higher likelihood of remembrance for items close to the current temporal position, with
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a distinct forward bias). These effects can be observed at different temporal scales
independently (scale invariance).
• Dissociation between the three sections of memory engagement (either through temporal
distance or through actively induced distraction) or between their items leads to the
breaking of scale invariance in rehearsal, and/or to the loss of recency in recall.
The following discussion attempts to forge a connection between the two fields. Music
does not play a role in the argument per se; hence, I will mention it only if it adds a peculiar
perspective. Actually applying some of my results to the First Brandenburg Concerto will
be relegated to the next chapter.
As a leitfaden through the argument, let me pose the problems we shall have to address:
• How do the referential signs in the instructions become functional? What do they denote?
• Which common types of recall tasks/situations cause dissociation where?
• How can the presence of dissociation explain the absence of recency?
• What influence on memorization and remembrance has dissociation between either in-
structions and rehearsal or rehearsal and recall?
• Can we associate any features of memory with the semiotically defined icon and index
signs?
9.2 ANALYZING RECALL TASKS
In a plain neurospsychology experiment, the precepts of memorization seem clear: the basic
units supposed to be remembered are words and they are presented in and referred to as a
list. The words and their constituent sounds (the phonemes) need to be distinguished by the
subject from other sounds that are not part of the required units of remembrance. These
precepts are not self-evident; they need to be conveyed by a series of instructions from the
researcher to the subject, instructions that we may cumulatively refer to as the “recall task.”
Analysis reveals that such tasks specify several levels of memorization as well as several time
scales; based on this information (in neuroscience experiments provided immediately prior
to the experiment) the subject stores and remembers the list.
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A typical recall task might read: “At the initiation sign (or alternatively, after completion
of the distractor task), please write down those words in the studied list (read aloud) that
you remember.” The task contains several temporal markers that make quite clear which
stretches of time and time scales are involved:
1. Reference to the studied list limits the subject’s active efforts at memorization to the
time period between the beginning of rehearsal and the initiation of recall and only to
items that appear in the presented list.
2. Reference to the items as words demarcates the sounds constituting word expression
(phonemes) from other, ambient sounds that are part of what the subject perceives but
not words.
As it were, these two time scales seem to form absolute, referentially fixed scale boundaries.
Attention is diverted from anything happening at a smaller scale than words and at a larger
scale than the list, and any reference to list or items is assumed to be clear, with unequivocal
verbal references at either scale. Note that both scales are referentially defined independently
from one another. Of course, both indicators imply the existence of smaller parts, both
memorable and not; these are words and non-words for Observation 2 and memorable and
forgettable parts of the list for Observation 1. As we shall see below, neither the list nor the
constituent words are in fact unequivocally referential before the start of the experiment.
Their referentiality arises only in the storage process (for the words) and the remembrance
process (for the list as a remembered whole).
Apart from the scalar indicators, the above recall task also suggests what is and what
is not memorable about the various temporal markers noted. The instructions to ignore
anything outside the list and anything other than words are ensconced in the definitions of
scale above. Continuing in the enumeration,
3. The primary objective of remembrance is the words as parts of the list (the sample task
could well have left out reference to the “words in the studied list” and simply requested
remembrance of the “list” without changing the experimental outcome).
4. Any distractor if presented between the initiation of list presentation and the initiation
of recall is to be ignored in the list remembrance.
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Both these propositions influence the association of referential objects between the two levels,
that is, how the words become the list, in my opinion the actual process of memory formation.
Observation 3 opposes clearly the list as marked for remembrance to the words as unmarked,
thereby clarifying the hierarchy of the two scales, while Observation 4 points to the influences
on remembrance by items which could be considered memorable but are explicitly designated
forgettable. Interaction of all four of these aspects of the recall task will help to create the
peculiar pattern we observe in the results of word list recall.
Having clarified which levels participate in a recall situation, we need to examine the
motivations for recalling the information provided in rehearsal in a certain way deemed par-
simonious by the subject. These motivations are caused by the relation between instructions
and rehearsal. Parsimony undoubtedly leads to loss of information; paradoxically, this loss
may be a sign of mnemonic success worth risking if the remembered, replicated version of
the object fulfills the requirements of the recall situation. Whether the loss of information
is a catalyst or an obstacle to remembrance depends on the task with which the listener is
posed. (In fact, in the nature of recall tasks, a difference between musical remembrance and
word list recall will emerge. As promised above, I will only point out these differences and
postpone a discussion of music until the neuroscience has been dealt with.) Obviously, a
subject or listener will try to store at any time scale only what seems important with respect
to the task. Here, differentiations of importance between items emerge that will allow the
association (in memorization) of groups of items with the list level (as memorable items)
and others as remaining at the word level (as unmemorable).
The recall tasks posed in an experimental situation differ quite drastically from what
a subject might encounter when listening to music. Usually, experimental tasks, provided
directly before the rehearsal of items (the real experiment), reference a clear temporal field
for the putative sources of remembrance (the list). Thus, a strong connection is established
between the memorable and the bounded period in which it is supposed to happen. In terms
of the experiment being performed, the focus on the memorable units is understandable.
The results of the experiment are lists of remembered words. If the subject remembers the
entire list (whatever that may be) but does not clearly distinguish the words (for example,
by mixing-up the spelling), the researcher will not be able to collect the data she was looking
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for, namely the recall probabilities of each distinct word. Loss of information on the word
level would be disastrous; loss of information on the list level is admissible. In fact, it is the
measured entity. The instructions ordain a clear recall of items and a rough recall of the list
(even though the list is stil the primary focus).
In music, common recall tasks are, of course, self-posed. No instruction period per se
precedes rehearsal. The rehearsal period (that is, the performance or replay of the piece) is
clear, but the items (for example, motives, or sections, depending on the analytical desires
of the listener) are not clearly marked. No reference to prior knowledge of the piece’s
vocabulary, its motives, can be assumed. A test of memory, as in Figure 1, results in an
approximate rendering of the melody as a whole but not in the exact repetition of the
individual motives. Loss of information is if not welcome then at least accepted at the
item-(or word-)level but deemed problematic if it affects the whole.
9.3 MEMORY FORMATION
After this short excursion into music, we return to the remembrance of word lists as a well-
studied model. The stakes and the levels of memorization are now clear; it remains for
us to determine how memories are defined. Since we agreed that what we can designate
and discuss in memory, musical or otherwise, are referential entities, our attention shifts
towards the identification and, possibly, the creation of referentials. We commence with the
constitution of the words in the listening/rehearsal process.
As noted, the recall task defines a minimal level of units for remembrance, here words.
Immediately, we are posed with the question of what happens such that words, and not
phonemes, are considered the basic level of memorization. The decision is obviously not
made before the instructions because the subject cannot foresee the requirements of the recall
task. Once the recall task is known, however, and the importance of words as memorable
constituent units in the to-be-remembered list is clear, memory starts parsing the sounds
received through the subject’s ears into words and ambient sounds. In the second step of
the memorization process, the phonemes of each word are conceptualized as one instance.
List recall requires not knowledge of the words but only of their occurrence in the list.
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Temporally, a word may extend over the time to speak its phonemes or read its letters;
conceptually, as a word in a list, it becomes one instance in time. Hence, the instantized
words are sufficient to assure memorization according to the indications of the recall task.
Evidence for this is the variable nature of item recall: the subject may either call items out
aloud (recalling combinations of phonemes) or write them down (recalling combinations of
letters). Both the phoneme- and the letter-combinations employed in recall were not created
in rehearsal but referential knowledge imported from the subject’s past.
Referring back to the discussion of ways of signification in Chapter 7, we realize that this
creation of one parsimonious sign (the word as instance) for an extended, many-valued object
is an example of creating simultaneity and, thus, at least partly due to indexical signification.
Memory does not need to store the word per se because it has already been stored when
it was learned (for example, in kindergarten) or when it was last used. Currently, only an
indexical reference is necessary. Just why the created parsimony results in loss of information
(forgetting the phonemes) but allows to re-create them (or the letters representing the same
word in writing) when recall is requested can be more easily observed and discussed on the
larger scale of list recall.
In list recall, the objects of mnemonic desire are the items, the words. Accepting the
notion that even remembrance of the first item in the list needs to be triggered by the
recall of another, prior item, we look to the recall instructions for guidance in figuring out
the trigger item because the instructions are the only sources available to the subject in
the context of the experiment. The instructions provide two possible trigger times: the
beginning of the rehearsal process and its end (referenced by Observations 1 and 3 above;
given that the distractor is not to be considered a viable item, the last memorable one thus
appears before it). If no distractor is presented, the most recent item has a higher likelihood
of recall, and if recalled, it becomes the trigger for the next step in remembrance. With a
distractor, the penultimate item (the last on the list) has a relatively lower likelihood than
the first item because the separation from the temporal trigger is larger. The first item has
a higher probability of becoming the first in the recall list and, thus, of its temporal position
becoming the next trigger.
In the case of distraction, thus, the remembering subject is forced to jump backward to
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a past item, skipping the items in between by force of the recall task which defines the list
and not any of the items as objective of remembrance. Contrary to the backward jumps
required to distinguish the words and code their positions (which induced the forgetting of
the words’ actual phonemic composition), this one does not result in the elimination of the
list’s content. The objective of list recall forces the preservation of some (but not all) of its
content in active memory. Recall of the first item only when list recall is requested would
not be a successful execution of the task. Indexical signification to just one item as stand-in
is not enough; on the word-to-list transition, a different type of remembrance comes into
play.
After the first recalled item, this item (or rather, its temporal instance) is used as hook
for the next. The procedure is a search for maximum proximate likelihood; the CRP curve
(Figure 9) tells us that the immediately following item is the most likely one to be recalled.
Hence, the direction of recall here is forward while in indexical signification it is generally
backward.1 In principle, this search-and-recall procedure continues until either all items are
recalled (a very unlikely proposition) or (more likely) until remembrance hits an obstruction,
this being either the putative RI distractor (if recall started close to the end of the list) or
an unmemorable item. Of the latter kind there are two, those already excluded in the mem-
orization of the items’ temporal positions (for example, ambient noises) and those excluded
in the present attempt at list-level parsimony.
Instructions provided good anchors for deciding upon exclusion during rehearsal (the
subject is assumed to be familiar with the sound and usage of words even if not necessarily
with the particular words themselves). For recall, there are no indicators about desirable
and undesirable items in the list. After a point in time has been established as temporal
marker, forward recall is likely favoring the subsequent item to be recalled next. However,
this regime does not hold throughout recall.2 With increasing distance from the start of
forward recall, its acuity wanes. It behaves like the declining positive-lag region of the CRP,
1Of course, in the situation of a free recall experiment, repeated recall of words in the same remembered
list is not desired; therefore, a possible return to previously recalled items in the process of remembrance
is not evident in the recall data. The experimental technique of overt rehearsal allows for examining such
repeated recalls.
2If forward recall would proceed unceasingly, and unerringly, recall would likely reproduce the complete
list of items.
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which has a clear forward bias only for recall of the first positive-lag item. With the second
positive-lag item already, there is a concurrence between choosing preceding against following
items; probabilities of recall are (roughly) equal. Which direction is chosen depends on the
whim of the moment. This possible confusion implies that the items recalled in a stretch of
forward recall are tied, through this process, to the first item in the row, which was reached
by a backward jump.
Should thus at some point the process of forward recall break (by running into already
recalled items) and a new item from earlier in the list become the next kernel, the list segment
of forward recalled items is separated from either of its neighboring elements by a break and
it has one item most likely to be recalled first, namely the first item in the segment.3 The
complete list is thus parsed and there exists the possibility of parsimonious reference to only
the first item of each segment without loosing the subsequent items of each segment entirely.
In terms of the Peircean trichotomy invoked earlier, we might think that the pure po-
tentiality of firstness signs (and iconic signification) is more likely to be represented by the
seemingly random backward jumps. However, while they may seem random, the jumps are
directional and they connect one temporal reference system, forward recall along the course
of time, to another, namely that of past referentials. An item becoming the first in a small
chain automatically acquires the nature of a referential; it will be the most likely of all sym-
bolically referenced items in that segment. The creation of simultaneity between past and
current courses of time in the moment of reference points to backward recall as indexical
signification. Forward recall, on the other hand, does not imply any meaning (in the sense of
inter-temporal connections) for the items being recalled. Their potential independent mean-
ing is still to be determined while their current meaning derives from the small segment of
items of which they are part and parcel. Hence, I shall classify forward recall under iconic
signification.
It remains for us to re-evaluate the role of referential signification. Referentials are triv-
ially involved in any account of signification. The structure of the recalled temporal construct
is built through iconic and indexical signification, depending on how the constituent parts
3Unless, of course, the items in the mini-list are the last items in the large list, in which case an immediate,
undissociated request for recall hugely favors them as recency items.
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of the temporal structure are stressed. While iconic signification assures the recall envi-
ronment’s cohesion, indexical signification enables referential access to objects both inside
and across the boundaries of this environment. Parsimony results from the employment or
the creation of referential segments and their embedding in the currently recalled list. For
example, the words of a free recall rehearsal task need not be learned anymore; the creation
of their meaning, that is, a convenient way of accessing information about these successions
of letters/phonemes, has already been achieved, say, in grade school. In word list recall, the
indexically recalled items are thus actually the relative temporal positions of the particular
words while the re-produced words are referential and the placement of these words in recall is
iconic. By implication, referentials (the known phoneme- or letter-successions) influence the
subject’s parsing of the phoneme list heavily. Knowing the symbolic references (the words),
the researcher can make predictions about the subject’s phoneme list parsings. Similarly,
knowledge of referentials in music, for example, prominent motives or historically conven-
tional successions of formal parts, aids the parsing of a musical piece. Therefore, referentials
are the most reliable indicators for predictions about parsing. Alas, the importance of these
observations about signification and remembrance to music deserves a separate chapter. I
will proceed by outlining how the above picture of recall can be aligned with the listening
process in music.
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10.0 REMEMBRANCE IN MUSIC
10.1 GENERAL APPLICATIONS
Having forged a connection between Peircean semiotics and the neuropsychology of memory,
we are now charged with demonstrating its relevance to music. While semiotics (just like
semiology) has found applications in musicology,1 the particular brand of mnemonic semiotics
suggested above requires explicit tethers to musical facts. In view of my focus on a specific
piece of music (the first movement of J. S. Bach’s First Brandenburg Concerto) and on
a peculiar problem (the constitution of ritornello structure while listening to the piece),
the following remarks will end with an interpretation of the results of the paradigmatic
analysis earlier. However, the gained insights into musical semiotics should not be applied
too narrowly. In the subsequent paragraphs, I will suggest more broadly applicable guises of
the semiotic terminology before narrowing onto the semiotic recreation of ritornello structure
in memory.
To reiterate, parsing clarifies the temporal dimensions and boundaries of both the re-
hearsal list, its segments, and the complete recall event such that temporal relations between
them can become functional. In memorization, these temporal relations inform the signi-
fication of a compound temporal object through a temporal sign that may or may not be
encoded as part of the object, creating parsimony.
1Witness Turino’s “Signs,” op. cit., or in a less rigorous application, Steven Feld’s “Aesthetics as Iconicity
of Style, or ‘Lift-Up-Over Sounding’: Getting Into the Kaluli Groove” [Yearbook for Traditional Music 20
(1988): 74-113]. In this and other articles, Feld stresses the examination of indigenous musical vocabulary
as a point of entry for the understanding of musical traditions alien to the researcher; by the same token,
historical musicology would imply the study of emerging terminology in Western art music. Originally, this
study was to include a section on the evolving usage of the words “ritornello,” “cadence,” “incipit” and
the like; after contemplating the scale and methodological focus of this inquiry, I have relegated this line of
research to a more explicitly historical study.
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Musical signs are often encoded in the same compound object, for example, a motive may
stand for a symphony, or the tonic pitch and the employed mode for the key development of
a whole section. Equally, musical signs can signify objects not encoded in the same object,
for example, the occurrence of one section may herald the coming of another. In both cases,
historical knowledge (or bias), in the form of traditional and applied theoretical concepts,
enables the listener’s mnemonic judgments. Just as references in the instructions for word
list recall enabled the subject to parse and store the list, these concepts encourage the listener
to differentiate between memorable and forgettable features in music. Jacques Attali, in his
book Noise,2 talks about such designations at the level of large-scale musical utterances, like
whole pieces or genres. Social forces determine which kind of sound is considered “music”
and which is considered “noise.” At the level of words and musical motives, which will be
our focus, such sociological biases may be seen to operate, too, through commonly accepted
definitions about what, say, a “ritornello” is. We will not delve deeply into these biases but
they are acknowledged as the driving force for the binary oppositions that allow parsing and,
hence, memorization.
Of the two types of musical signs distinguished above, the first (signifying in a compound)
is indexical, even if the listener still listens to the same section of music. Effectively, memory
unifies the segments into the one same section post listening. The sign refers to an already
perceived object, thus allowing the intersection of two temporally distinct processes in the
moment of reference, which is a requirement of indexical signification. Also, if the object is
what the listener would consider an extended section, reference to the section as one thing,
such as its key or key development, simultaneizes the extended temporal period, again a
characteristic of indexicality.
The second kind of musical sign (signifying towards an expected future event), is iconic.
Given the listener’s conscious position in a section that implies another, the potential of
the second section is present throughout the first. As an example we might point to the
interaction between ritornellos and episodes. Once the listener is clear about currently
hearing a ritornello, the upcoming section is automatically assumed to be an episode. (The
2Noise: The Political Economy of Music [trans. Brian Massumi, intr. Fredric Jameson and Susan McClary,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985].
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same holds vice versa.) As soon as the new section begins, the iconic significance of its
predecessor wanes and the listener re-situates herself within the piece’s structure.
The last observation can be generalized: given that the iconic expectation was based on
previous knowledge and knowledge of the current temporal position of the listener within
the movement, we might assume that a similarly iconic premonition holds true for all cases
when the listener can expect an event to happen in the near future but does not know the
exact time. Iconic signification, then, implies a hypothesis on the listener’s part about the
structure of the movement, while indexical signification, when it becomes possible within the
confines of the movement, replaces the hypothesis with past-oriented facts. In a sense, the
listening process starts out with a completely hypothetical structure of the music in mind,
this hypothetical structure (based on referential knowledge of musical conventions) influences
how the musical items presented to the listener in performance are memorized, and at the
end of the listening process, the structure is actualized in memory, to be remembered at
will. Voluntary remembrance then triggers another, generative process that transforms the
structure, now symbolically fixed (the indexical connections have become referential), into
another succession of motives which, when being recalled, is transforming the indexical signs
referencing the memorized structure into the iconic, processual parts of remembrance.
Indexicality and iconicity (in the sense used here) are thus two complementary processes
that govern the transition of musical thoughts from their practical (audible) exposure in per-
formance to the structural representation in the listening individual and back into a practical
(and ideally, audible) rendition by the remembering listener. This receptive process, with the
music listener at the nexus between a prior indexical and a subsequent iconic process (mem-
orization and remembrance), is similar to the situation of the music producer (the composer
and performer). Here, the significant pathways start with conventional knowledge of compo-
sitional history (both personal and general) being iconically crafted (through composition)
into a succession from which a structure (the score) emerges indexically (if we allow for the
correlation between memorization and notation).3 In both cases, whether the structure is
3In performance, the connection between composer and listener, this structure is then read indexically
and put into music, that is, performed, iconically. One extensive treatment of performance, both from the
point of view of listeners and performers/composers, is Christopher Small’s Musicking: The Meanings of
Performing and Listening [Hanover, N.H.: University of New England Press, 1998]. Small does not develop
his ideas based on neuropsychology but his general assertions about the influence of the social situation on
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retained in memory through the association with verbal concepts (enabling oral transmis-
sion of knowledge) or whether it is retained in the score through association with written
conceptualizations (the symbols of notation, enabling written transmission), the repositories
of musical thoughts are referential entities. Their ability to preserve one concept over long
periods of time (such as the term “ritornello” over several hundred years) makes them repos-
itories but not creators of meaning. They provide the data which, in their amalgamation
with the idiosyncratic force of the individual composer’s, listener’s, or performer’s mnemonic
faculty, become facta.
10.2 TOWARDS A MNEMONICALLY SOUND DESCRIPTION OF
RITORNELLO PROCESS
Lest we get caught ever deeper in the theoretical web of meaning, let me turn away from the
Parnassus and see whether the differentiation between iconic and indexical signs may have
any bearings on the matters raised in the fifth chapter. There, we postponed judgment on
the relevance of incipits and cadences for the memorization and remembrance of ritornello
structure. Now, bolstered with some experience and some ideas how indexical and iconic
signs may become mnemonically relevant, let us approach the subject again.
In the same manner as when analyzing recall tasks, we need to ask what the levels of the
recall task in a ritornello movement are. Objective of the task is the mnemonic recovery of
sections that provide a good account for the whole of the movement, both in melodic content
and form. Obviously, recalling the ritornello alone, even if it were a nice melody, would not
account for the special character of the form. Therefore, a mixture of ritornello- and episodic
elements seems the more likely choice. Again, as in word list recall, we are confronted
with a double task for memory, first the identification of the ritornello as such and second
its employment in the structure. The levels involved are one basic melodic/motivic level
(comparable to the list of phonemes and ambient sounds constituting the rehearsal period),
another level in which sections, ritornellos and episodes, are differentiable, and the temporally
music encompass the scale I would ultimately like to reach with my model; in this paper, though, only the
foundation has been laid.
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most extended level, the movement as a whole. Where previouly the concept of word list
recall (as opposed to sound recall or word recall) provided for a motivation to remember and
to create indexical and iconic references between different time scales, here the concept of
ritornello structure fulfills the same purpose. Like the other examples, ritornello structure,
already in its name, suggests a connection between the small-scale section ritornello and the
larger scale of the complete movement. The premise for our inquiry shall then be that if the
listener can identify the ritornello, she will have a handle at the movement’s structure.
In the light of listening as a temporally extended process, this premise might be formu-
lated slightly differently: once we have a clear idea of the confines of the ritornello, we will
be able to identify it in the movement. Depending on the constitution of the movement,
this point in time when we can securely trust our memory enough to forget about the in-
teraction between motives and sections and concentrate on the interaction of sections and
movement arrives sooner or later. Our simpleminded ritornello from Table 1 is a relatively
straightforward example.
The listener commences listening with the general knowledge of ritornello form as con-
sisting of one repeating section with which the movement starts and ends as well as several
interspersed different sections. Trivially, the first remarkable instance is the beginning of
the movement; on the movement-level, the section-level, and the motive-level, the beginning
provides an index, but the listener’s attention is guided iconically towards the end of the
current section on all three levels because this will allow him to form and confirm hypotheses
about the structure.
As the music continues, iconic signification of the upcoming episode remains but attention
to and memorization of the ritornello’s motives wane. The central measures of the current
section do not require reference to earlier music. This changes with the advent of the cadence.
Here, the iconic expectation of the cadential motive is fulfilled through indexical reference
to the incipit, offering the compounding of the whole stretch of music from the incipit to
the cadence as one on the section-level. The incipit gets reinforced through reference, the
cadence becomes potentially important as ending of the ritornello.
Notably, the cadence cannot be securely memorized as ending of the ritornello because
the first episode has not been heard yet. Quite possibly, the next section of music could be
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another part of the ritornello. In our example from Table 1 this is not the case.
A different incipit starts the next section. Iconic expectation shifts now to this section’s
completion and the putative return of the initial incipit. As the cadence of the episode is
reached, iconic expectation on the motive-level becomes again an indexical compacting of
the episode’s incipit and cadence into another representation of the concept section. Iconic
expectation on the section-level is still in limbo because the listener is still unsure about the
nature of this section’s formal function.
The return of the initial incipit provides the decisive jump from the scale interaction
between motives and sections to that between sections and the movement. Hearing the
initial motive implies
• on the motive-level, the unexpected return of a familiar motive (unexpected because
the previous section was not unequivocally listened to as episodic) and thus indexical
reference to its most recent occurrence,
• on the section-level, the expected return of the first section (expected because the ritor-
nello incipit is expected to return some time after the ritornello’s cadence) and thus an
indexical reference to the whole first section, and
• on the movement-level, the unexpected hearing of the ritornello section, unexpected
because the designation of sections was previously not completely clear.
The indexical fixing of the ritornello through double reference on the motivic and section
levels provides for the clear association of the ritornello’s incipit and (if the same as in the
initial appearance) cadence as referential signs of the section ritornello. The ritornello’s
incipit is now no longer just the incipit of a section but stands for this movement’s ritornello
as such. Any subsequent occurrence of the motive (more strongly even when followed by the
proper cadence) will suggest the section ritornello. If the indexical fixing had not happened,
that is, if the episodic material had continued beyond the cadence, iconic expectation for
the section ritornello would not have been transformed into indexical knowledge.
On the basis of these observations we can now make the following mnemonically sound
definition of a ritornello: a piece of music that begins with the initial motive of the movement
and ends with the cadential motive of the first cadence prior to a section that keeps its
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episodic character throughout. Judgments about the extent of the ritornello can thus only
be made after listening to a complete episode (one defined by a distinct incipit and a cadence)
and the first return of the initial motive.
Implicitly, the recurrence of the ritornello’s head motive will also start signifying iconi-
cally the advent (after the next, not terribly mnemonically important cadence) of an episode.
In the effort of identifying and memorizing the structure of the movement, this episode’s ca-
dence is now indexically referring to this episode’s beginning. Indexical references to other
episodes (such as the one preceding the previous ritornello) are less likely because the ritor-
nello in between, by virtue of its different formal function, acts as distractor; the incipits
of the now more clearly identifiable episodes are possibly remembered, the episodes as full
sections not. Thereby, the ritornello, once it has been identified and defined as a section,
suppresses memorization of all but the most salient parts of the episodes. The formal hi-
erarchy between ritornello and episode, postulated at the outset as a referential convention
and iconic formal expectation, has been realized in the listening process.
While we might decide to follow the plain ritornello structure of Table 1 to the end, I
suggest that (as a rounding-off of this inquiry) we return once more to the First Brandenburg
Concerto and observe the somewhat more complicated ritornello process taking place there.
(The reader is encouraged to consult a score and Table 2.)
As usual, the first incipit (m. 1) is prefaced by the (conceptually, not actually) distracting
silence of “no music.” It provides the disjoined starting point iconically signifying what
comes after it. This moment after the silence, the initial incipit (IncA) and the subsequent
measures, comes to an abrupt end with the recognizable cadence CadA in m. 5. Given the
conventions of ritornello form, this cadence partitions the melody, signifies indexically the
end of the first few measures and iconically the start of a new section. The listener imports
symbolic knowledge based on his experience of having listened to (or read about) ritornello
form in Baroque concertos; given the conventions of the form, the next section ought to be
an episode.
As the next section starts, this assumption seems at first justified. The new melodic
material in m. 6 is taken to signify an episodic section of the movement. Then, however, an
interference between the expected form and the actual happenstances of the music, namely
79
the gradual return to a fuller orchestration, throws the second incipit as beginning of the
first episode into doubt. As we arrive at m. 12, CadB is reached. The fact that it is an
ornamented version of m. 5 goes along with this particular kind of cadence as indexically
signifying the end of a ritornello, but not yet the end of the, that is, the initial, ritornello as
a memory template. The listener cannot be sure yet whether what was just heard was an
episode or a ritornello. The tonal closure on the first beat of m. 13 gives a hint (F is again
the tonic pitch) but the change of texture is not drastic enough to suggest episodic character
for the following measures; especially the continued use of the horns stands out (in my ears)
as challenging the designation of mm. 13ff. as episodic.
Insecurity about the actual role of the music persists through the next section until
cadence CadC in m. 17. Comparison of the corresponding sections in Figures 2 and 1 shows
a sharp drop-off of accuracy after m. 13. The initial incipit makes an appearance but is too
accidental and sudden to induce the idea of a proper ritornello. We might consider m. 15
a new ritornello, but the two-measure (!) episode preceding it does not end with the cadence
required; it segues into the putative ritornello. If there were closure on the motivic level this
would allow us to count the preceding two measures as a separate section and, thus, assume
the following IncA to be the beginning of a new ritornello, signifying on the level of sections.
Unfortunately, there is no cadence preceding m. 15.
Only in m. 17 do we arrive at CadC, clearly a section ending, and only there do the
two melodies in Figures 2 and 1 agree again (in the second half of the measure, the actual
cadential motive). What follows is at first IncB, the return of a putative episode. Its return
here signifies, if not a return of the ritornello (an entity as yet not clearly definable) then at
least the clear episodicity of the section between the first occurrence of CadB (m. 12) and
this recurrence of IncB in m. 18. In this movement, as opposed to the previously discussed
ideal ritornello movement, the identification of episodic sections seems to be quite a bit easier
than the recognition of the ritornello.
IncB in m. 18ff. is followed by material that is not distinctive, being borrowed from the
long past Fortspinnung of the first segment, mm. 3-4. But this segues into CadA in m. 23.
This is the first explicit indexical reference to material from the putative ritornello, i.e., the
section starting the movement. (IncA in m. 15 was not introduced by a cadence.) CadA is
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introduced by the previous IncB (m. 18), which was so far the only indexically referencing
return of any incipit. Hence, by the end of m. 23, we may surmise that the section between
the two syntagms has ritornello character. This is reinforced by the very episodic (soloist)
character of mm. 24-26 (IncD). Finally, it seems that we get a grip at what is episode and
what ritornello.
The episodic character of IncD harkens iconically for the return of a strong ritornello
incipit. We do not have a cadential formula in the strict sense, presumably because motivic
completion of this episodic section would upset the tenuous balance of power that episodes
and ritornello hold at this point in the movement. The clear return of IncA in m. 27 finally
tips this balance between which kind of section will have more of a grip on our mnemonic
image of the movement in favor of the ritornello.
For reference, a graphic representation of the movement’s structure up to m. 27 can be
found in Figure 13; it follows the same procedure and conventions as Figure 4. Applying
Hebbian principles (as in Figure 5) does not yield any insights into ritornello process be-
cause, at such an early stage in the movement, just after the first section clearly identifiable
as episode, commonly used successions have not been established. Disregarding bidirectional
successions (as in Figure 6), which helped establish cycles as a ritornello structure charac-
teristic, gives a faint suggestion of cyclic behavior. Separating the bidirectional connection
between CadA and IncB, we see that section B is already defined as episode with respect to
section C. Likewise, section A interacted with IncD. However, IncA is itself an interspersion
in section C, not preserving the integrity of a putative ideal ritornello. The graphic rep-
resentation thus gives a rough rendering of the general characteristics, but no insight into
what one might call the behavior of the individual paradigms and the sections they possibly
constitute.
Observations from the ritornello process, however, have yielded at this point already a
wealth of information about the paradigms participating in the movement, even though they
have not yet been extensively used. Let us take stock of what knowledge the listener might
have gathered about the ritornello: it starts with IncA but the occurrence of IncA does not
necessarily imply the occurrence of a ritornello; it need not move immediately to CadA;
CadA would accomodate prior to it either IncA or IncB; IncB is also a legitimate ritornello
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IncA
CadA
IncB
CadB
IncC
CadCIncD
IncE
CadE
Figure 13: Successions in BWV 1046/1 until M. 27
incipit, though it is usually unconnected to section A (the complete stretch from IncA to
CadA). The episodes are clear in the case of IncD but clear in retrospect only in the case of
IncC through CadC. If a subject were to recall the succession of motives from memory, she
might well consider letting IncD follow section A, using the first and best remembered incipit
as ritornello incipit and following it up with the least ambiguous episode. The successions of
sections that were easily identifiable in the idealized movement of Figure 3, with a departure-
and-return strategy of the musical trace, are no longer thus easily identified in the more
complicated structure represented by Figure 4. Here, the cyclical structures characterizing
the generic ritornello movement seem to be more based on departure-and-return between
segments than between sections. If any section did behave like a ritornello, it would have
been section B.
The above discussion did not provide the clean analytical picture one might have hoped
for. But in the fifth chapter the various accounts of ritornello structure, leading up to the
identification of a split (or duple) ritornello, did not provide us with any evidence for the
likelihood that such a structure might also emerge through active listening. The extended
discussion showed that especially IncB and the whole section B take on ritornello charac-
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teristics more clearly than section A, which is predestined as ritornello incipit because of its
position at the beginning of the movement. The role of IncB as well as any of the other
paradigms was not clear until we took the pains of examining the interaction of different time
scales at each step in the sequential process of listening. Only then did the conflict between
section A, ritornello by virtue of being the first group of sounds heard at the beginning of the
movement, and section B, ritornello by virtue of its interactions with surrounding motivic
material, clearly emerge.
While the stereotypical structure of the ideal ritornello movement indeed invites the
analysis of music as structure, the duple structure of the First Brandenburg Concerto chafes
against structuralization, even if it at some point succumbs to the strictures of the genre.
By teasing out the institution of a fixed concept of the ritornello in the listener’s mind until
more than one quarter through the movement,4 the listener is lead astray and has to involve
herself more in a work that, by the unspoken laws of music, would be the domain of the
composer: the generation of an easily understandable image, one that can be reproduced
without fault or loss of crucial information. If the creation of (however individual) mnemonic
images from auditory data is the ultimate purpose of music reception, then music such as
this ritornello movement encourages and requires a creative engagement, too, one the listener
ought not to shy.
4And much longer if we wish to unify and account for all paradigms usually considered to be part of the
ritornello in the appropriate order and importance.
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11.0 CONCLUSIONS
This paper was conceived of as an investigation into the promises of researching listening and
the way in which we perceive temporal structure in music through it. Given that I postulated
the importance of memory for listening practice, and the promise of neuropsychological
results about word list memory, I needed to establish a reasonably tight connection between
neuropsychology and musicology. The most amenable field, both for purposes of graphic
representation of musical melodies and for the translation of different modes of memorization
and remembrance into musicological vocabulary, seemed semiotics, both Saussurean and
Peircean.
While Saussurean semiotics does not allow a good philosophical representation of the
highly fluctuating processes of comparison involved in the assessment of music through
memory, the clear, itemized description of temporal succession provided by paradigmatic
analysis eases the graphic representation of the remembered musical items. Informing the
order of these items are concepts that were characterized as potentially symbolic signifiers
(in my terminology, referentials), as fixed in their value over time, and as clearly defining
their area of applicability in the mind of the applying person. Given their non-malleable
nature and bounded meaning, they were considered not part of the process of mnemonic
meaning formation but means for meaning preservation outside the individual’s memory.
The mnemonic components of meaning formation were found to be isomorphic to in-
dexical and iconic means of signification. In word list memory, the two observable features
of recency and contiguity were associated with indexical and iconic signs, respectively, by
researching the structure and requirements of typical recall tasks, and aligning their results
with the characteristics of the two types of signification in the Peircean sense.
The original cause for this inquiry, a confusion about ritornello structure in J. S. Bach’s
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BWV 1046/1, was not resolved but putative reasons for the confusion were provided and
a different method for researching and evaluating musical memories has been developed.
Instrumental is the comparison of mnemonic traces with graphical traces available, for ex-
ample, in a score. The differences of the mnemonic trace, indicative of the difficulties in
remembering certain features, point to issues within the music where different structural
determinants (motivic structure, movement structure) conflict with one another. The res-
olution of these conflicts may be different in the score and in the listener’s memory. The
developed neurologico-semiotic corollaries of recency/indexicality and contiguity/iconicity
may help in both cases but their central value lies in establishing a codependence between
musicology and the neuropsychology of memory whenever musicologists examine musical
memory or the listening process.
Obviously, this paper provides only a glance at the subject of memory in musical remem-
brance. Each section warrants exploration and would benefit from the broader treatment
prevented by the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, I hope to have given the necessary
broad survey of how two such disparate fields, one a science, the other a discipline of the
humanities, can be associated.
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